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FOSTERING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP:
SHARK TANK SHOULDN’T BE THE MODEL 
Brian Kingsley Krumm∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
For the past half century, innovation has driven the economic 
growth that has made the American economy the envy of the 
world.1  For most of this period, venture capitalists provided not 
only the capital that new innovative companies needed, but also 
the management expertise.2  In the last fifteen years, however, the 
venture-capital business has changed.  Many venture capitalists 
no longer provide money and mentoring to the proverbial inven-
tor working out of her garage.  Instead, they primarily focus their 
        ∗ Associate Professor, Director of the Business Clinic at the University of Tennessee 
College of Law, and a Member of the Anderson Center for Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
Research Council, Haslam College of Business.  The author is grateful for the incisive 
thoughts and comments of George Kuney, Don Leatherman, Alex Long, Maurice Stucke, 
Joan Heminway, Robert Lloy, and Shubha Ghosh.  Thanks to all those who participated in 
reviewing and commenting on this article at the Georgia State University College of Law 
Faculty Exchange and the Transformative Dialogues Faculty Workshop at Syracuse Univer-
sity College of Law.  The research assistance of Will Rogers and Charlotte Hauser is also 
gratefully acknowledged.   
1. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL (US) COMM. ON COMPARATIVE NAT’L INNOVATION 
POLICIES: BEST PRACTICE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: U.S. 
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 201 (Charles W. Wessner & Alan Wm. 
Wolff eds., 2012), http://politiques-innovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2012-
Wessner-STEP-Rising-to-the-Challenge-U.S.-Innovation-Policy-for-Global-Economy.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/8B5G-3MCP].  
2. Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, BROOK. L. REV. 1163,
1169 (2013). 
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investments on companies that are already established and gener-
ating revenue.3  And even this funding is available only to com-
panies located in a few geographic areas.4 
This pullback could not have happened at a worse time.  In-
terest in entrepreneurship and innovation is at an all-time high.  
Nearly a quarter of millennials say they want to be some sort of 
entrepreneur.5  State governments are focusing their economic 
development efforts on stimulating entrepreneurism and redirect-
ing resources they formerly spent attempting to recruit industry 
from other states.6  While zeal for entrepreneurialism is growing, 
a recent Gallup poll suggests that the number of net U.S. Firms 
has steadily decreased since 1977 to the point where there are 
more net closures than startups.7 
Given such glaring contradictions, it seems reasonable to 
question how best to finance innovation, or rather how to better 
coordinate a series of financing opportunities.  Not surprisingly, 
the federal government has introduced funding programs to fund 
new businesses, and several new forms of organizations have de-
veloped to assist entrepreneurs in their attempt to commercialize 
their innovations.8  These new organizations have helped, but 
much more needs to be done.  This article proposes a new kind of 
3. FOUNDER EQUITY, THE NEW REALITY OF VENTURE CAPITAL: DISCONNECT
BETWEEN VALUE CREATION AND CAPTURE, http://politiques-innovation.org/ wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/07/2012-Wessner-STEP-Rising-to-the-Challenge-U.S.-Innovation-Policy-
for-Global-Economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3GC-63WG].   
4. JOSH LERNER, GEOGRAPHY, VENTURE CAPITAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY 1 (2010),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu /sites /default /files /centers /taubman /files /PB_final_lerner_ 
vc.pdf  [https://perma.cc/7YYC-V6DZ].  
5. 24% Of Millennials Plan To Start Their Own Business, But Have The Generation
Called Time On Traditional Family Values?, MINTEL (Nov. 19, 2014), 
http://www.mintel.com/press-centre/social-and-lifestyle/enter-the-entrepreneurs-a-quarter-
of-millennials-plan-to-start-their-own-business-but-have-the-generation-called-time-on-tra-
ditional-family-values [https://perma.cc/AWC6-YMDY].   
6. ERIN SPARKS, NAT’L GOVERNOR’S ASS’N, TOP TRENDS IN STATE ECON. DEV. 5
(2013), https://www.nga.org /files /live /sites /NGA /files /pdf /2013 /1308 TopTrends in-
StateEconDevPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2EZ-WJ9Q].   
7. Jim Clifton, American Entrepreneurship: Dead or Alive?, GALLUP.COM, (Jan. 13,
2015), http://www.gallup.com/businessjournal /180431/american-entrepreneurship-dead-
alive.aspx [https://perma.cc/2TSG-N8A2].  
8. See, e.g., Meredith Wood, 7 Small Business Grants for Entrepreneurs,
STARTUPNATION (Aug. 9, 2016), https://startupnation.com/start-your-business/small-busi-
ness-loans/ [https://perma.cc/YBH9-HHXG]; Thomas Smale, 10 Organizations That Pro-
vide Support for Entrepreneurs, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.entrepre-
neur.com/article/253283 [https://perma.cc/5CAT-B6D7].  
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business organization, one that can serve to fill the gap that ven-
ture capital currently does not fill. 
Part I of this article provides the reader with a perspective on 
how innovation has been financed over the years and how the 
roles of the federal government and private equity have evolved 
in this process.  Parts II and III examine the role that private in-
vestment plays in the current innovation finance ecosystem, and 
identifies both the inefficiencies and value enhancing attributes of 
that source of financing.  Part IV describes the major federal pol-
icy initiatives implemented in recent years to bolster funding for 
start-ups and other small businesses.  Part V, which is the heart of 
this article, proposes the creation of a business association specif-
ically designed to help entrepreneurs secure the necessary capital 
and to assist them in the management of their businesses. 
I.  HISTORY OF INNOVATION FINANCE 
Most economics scholars believe that innovation has been 
the main driver of long-term economic growth in the United 
States.9  Beyond macro-economic growth, innovation increases 
per capita income and improves standards of living and quality of 
life.10  Because innovation has such a dramatic impact on both 
our economy and our social welfare, it is crucial that we look at 
how innovation has been financed in the past and how recent 
changes in financing practices may limit innovation in the future. 
9.
In the most fundamental sense, there are only two ways of increasing the out-
put of the economy: (1) you can increase the number of inputs that go into the 
productive process, or (2) if you are clever, you can think of new ways in 
which you can get more output from the same number of inputs.  
NATHAN ROSENBERG, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., INNOVATION AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (2004), http://www.oecd.org /cfe /tourism /34267902.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4RUP-D6QK].  
10. David Ahlstrom, Innovation and Growth: How Business Contributes to Society,
24 ACAD. OF MGMT. PERSPECTIVES 11, 11-12 (2010).  In this article, Ahlstrom challenges 
famed economist Milton Freidman’s contention that business’ sole purpose is to generate 
profits for shareholders.  Id.  Instead, he argues that the main goal of business is to develop 
new and innovative products that generate growth and deliver important benefits to an in-
creasingly wide range of the world’s population.  Id. 
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The Patent Act of 183611 played a significant role in provid-
ing creative individuals with the freedom to innovate and main-
tain their independence from the firms that bought or licensed 
their intellectual property.12  Inventors at that time were able to 
obtain financing primarily from friends, families, and retained 
earnings.13  By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, 
the contractual mobility of even the most prolific inventors waned 
as they increasingly joined companies as principals or employ-
ees.14  This shift was due in large part by the risks associated with 
and rising costs of Research and Development (R&D).15  The 
complexity and capital intensity of new technology made it more 
difficult for inventors to obtain sources of outside financing.16  
The firms benefitted not only from owning the intellectual prop-
erty that was created by the inventors, but also from the reduced 
competition from subsequent innovations that would make the 
prior practices obsolete.17 
Most of the firms that invested heavily in R&D during this 
period were entrepreneurial companies that formed to commer-
cialize the discoveries of their inventors.18  Forming companies 
around prominent inventors was quite popular at this time, and 
11. Patent Act of 1836, Ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (July 4, 1836).
12. FINANCING INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1870 TO THE PRESENT 12 (Na-
omi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff eds., 2007). Thomas Hughes referred to the late 
nineteenth century as the “golden age for independent inventors.” Id.   
13. See id. at 14.
14. Id. at 12-13 (citation omitted).
15. Id. at 13.
16. Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 12, at 13 (citing JOHN W. KENDRICK,
PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES (1961)).  
17. Id. (citing STEVEN W. USSELMAN, REGULATING RAILROAD INNOVATION:
BUSINESS, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLITICS IN AMERICA (2002)).  Firm defensive strategies 
were greatly assisted by a shift in the judiciary to favor employers regarding patent and trade 
secret disputes.  Id. at 32 n.17.  See also Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’ 
from the ‘Fire of Genius’: Law and the Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1127, 1139 (1998) (“Finally, at the end of the nineteenth century, courts began to see that 
employers might hire a person precisely because of his ‘inventive capacities’ and that the 
employer might therefore own the product of the employee’s creativity.”).  
18. See Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 12, at 14. “Perhaps the most famous ex-
ample is General Electric, formed from a merger of two core enterprises that had been orga-
nized by investors with the aim of commercializing the inventions of Thomas Edison and 
Elihu Thompson.” Id. (citation omitted). 
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financing was often informally raised by backers who were per-
sonally aquatinted with the inventors.19  Funding from more for-
mal institutions, such as banks and organized securities markets, 
only arose in the later 1920’s.20  R&D intensive firms like General 
Electric, Du Pont, Westinghouse Electric, General Motors, and 
IBM all became prominent on the stock exchanges.21  They relied 
on a strategy of developing new technologies in the lab and 
achieving returns directly from the innovations through the sale 
of their goods and services.22  Funding for future research was 
generated through retained earnings.23 
With the advent of World War II, the federal government 
began playing a much greater role in the funding of R&D.24  Most 
of the national R&D budget was funded by government, most of 
which came through the Defense Department where the research 
was focused predominately on defense technologies.25  Although 
research was by its very nature closely controlled for secrecy, it 
had some extraordinary ancillary benefits.26  A large scale R&D 
infrastructure was created in federal laboratories and U.S. univer-
sities, which continues to serve as a highly productive source of 
innovation.27  Federal R&D programs created an environment for 
interfirm technology diffusion and encouraged the creation of 
19. Id.; see also Diego Comin & Ramana Nanda, Financial Development and Tech-
nology Diffusion 4 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15-036, 2014) (“A[s] interest in 
these sorts of opportunities grew, technologically creative entrepreneurs increasingly sought 
out investors (and vice versa) because the greater technical complexity and capital intensity 
of the new technologies meant that effective programs of inventive activity and commercial 
exploration required more financial backing than before.”). 
20. Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 12, at 16.
21. Id. at 19; see also HAROLD PASSER, THE ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURERS, 1875-
1900: A STUDY IN COMPETITION, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, TECHNICAL CHANGE, AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 149-50 (1953); DAVID HOUNSHELL & JOHN KENLY SMITH JR., 
SCIENCE AND CORPORATE STRATEGY: DU PONT R&D (1988); ALFRED SLOAN, MY YEARS 
WITH GENERAL MOTORS 216 (John McDonald & Catharine Stevens eds., 1964). 
22. See Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 12 at 19 (citations omitted).
23. See id.
24. Id. at 21-22.
25. See id. at 21.  “Through most of the 1953-2005 period, more than 50 percent of
th[e] federal R&D budget was devoted for defense purposes.”  Kira R. Fabrizio & David C. 
Mowery, The Federal Role in Financing Major Innovations: Information Technology Dur-
ing the Postwar Period, in FINANCING INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1870 TO THE 
PRESENT 283, 283 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff eds., 2007).   
26. See Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 12, at 21-22.
27. Fabrizio & Mowery, supra note 25, at 287.
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new companies to support this massive effort.28  In many in-
stances, expenditures on procurement rather than the R&D pro-
grams themselves produced widespread innovations.29  The nas-
cent information technology (IT) sector (semiconductors, 
internet, computer hardware and software) in particular made sig-
nificant advancements as a result of procurement in support of the 
federal R&D programs.30  These technologies now encompass 
many markets and applications beyond national defense and have 
further spawned a multitude of civilian-focused innovations.31 
In the mid-1960’s private companies drastically reduced 
their spending on R&D.32  These cutbacks prompted firms to 
more closely evaluate their internal expenditures on R&D in an 
effort to control costs.33  Inventors were being required to justify 
their research expenditures and financial tests were imposed to 
reduce the risk of potential failure.34  Such management controls 
had a negative effect on the innovativeness of the labs.35  As a 
result, many research facilities experienced budget cuts, were 
spun off as separate companies, or were shut down entirely.36 
Over the next two decades, a number of small innovative 
companies began to emerge that were funded through the expand-
ing private equity market.37  The larger firms, in turn, focused 
28. Id. at 286.  Government programs have historically filled the void of investing in
early stage companies that are often too uncertain for the private markets.  Id. at 285. 
29. Id. at 285. 
30. Id. at 287.  Federal funding of R&D programs has played a major role in the de-
velopment of other post-war technologies, such as the pharmaceutical and biomedical sci-
ences, which have benefitted from R&D programs sponsored by the National Institutes of 
Health.  Fabrizio & Mowery, supra note 25, at 310. 
31. Id.  “The most obvious examples are the pharmaceuticals and biotechnology in-
dustries” which have been spurred on by the National Institutes of Health.  Id. 
32.  See Margaret B.W. Graham, Financing Fiber: Corning’s Invasion of the Telecom-
munications Market, in FINANCING INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1870 TO THE 
PRESENT 247, 256-57 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff eds., 2007).   
33. See id. at 257.  One of the driving forces for cutting R&D spending was the afore-
mentioned departure between R&D investments and innovation results.  Id. at 256; see also 
Margaret B.W. Graham, Industrial Research in the Age of Big Science, RESEARCH IN 
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (1985); David A. Hounshell, The Evolution of Industrial Re-
search in the United States, in ENGINES OF INNOVATION: U.S. INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AT 
THE END OF AN ERA 13, 50-51 (Richard S. Rosenbloom & William J. Spencer eds., 1996).  
34. See Graham, supra note 32, at 257.
35. See Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 12, at 20.
36. Id. at 21.
37. Id. at 24.
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their efforts on commercializing and marketing technologies cre-
ated by such business entities.38  The early successes by venture 
capital firms gave rise to significant growth in the venture capital 
industry.39  An important change in federal policy in 1979 al-
lowed U.S pension funds to invest in venture capital, resulting in 
significant growth in the industry.40  The late 1990’s were a 
“boom period” for venture capital as firms benefited from a surge 
in interest in the civilian applications for the internet and other 
computer technologies.41  Investments in both venture capital 
funds and portfolio companies reached record highs.42  However, 
venture capital financing peaked in early 2000.43  The stock mar-
ket crash of 2001 “shook the entire venture capital market as val-
uations for technology companies collapsed.”44  Many venture 
capital investors reduced their commitments and by 2003 the ven-
ture capital investments withered to less than half of their 2001 
levels.45  Since this time, venture capital investments have fluctu-
ated with the economy reaching a low in 2009 and achieving a 
post-2000 high level of $59.1 billion in 2015.46 
38. Id. at 26.
39. See Paul A. Gompers, The Rise and Fall of Venture Capital, 23 BUS. & ECON. 
HIST. 1, 7-10 (1994). 
40. See ANDREW METRICK & AYAKO YASUDA, VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE
FINANCE OF INNOVATION 11-12, 19-20 (Lacey Vitetta ed., 2d ed. 2011), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=929145 [https://perma.cc/6LUW-CWYS].  If you are a fiduciary, you are expected to 
act like a “prudent man.”  This means fiduciaries are to act “with the care, skill, prudence, 
and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like 
character and with like aims [.]”  29 USC § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2012).  Under the original appli-
cation, each investment was expected to adhere to risk standards on its own merits, limiting 
the ability of investment managers to make any investments deemed potentially risky.  Under 
the revised 1978 interpretation, the concept of portfolio diversification of risk, measuring 
risk at the aggregate portfolio level rather than the investment level to satisfy fiduciary stand-
ards would also be accepted. 
41. See METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 13.
42. See NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, 2016 NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL 
ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 11 (Thomson Reuters 2016) [hereinafter 2016 YEARBOOK], 
www.spurcap.com /nvca- yearbook- 2016.pdf. [https://perma.cc/PGZ7-UZ3N].   
43. See id. at 12.
44. Brian Krumm, Understanding the New Tennessee Small Business Investment
Company Credit Act: Stimulating Economic Growth at the Intersection of Free Market 
Capitalism and Government Intervention, 11 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENN. J. OF BUS. L. 
93, 99 (2010). 
45. See 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 12.
46. See id. at 9.  Since 2009, the venture capital activity level has increased for 6
consecutive years.  Id.  Despite this fact, the $59 billion in investments made in 2015 pales 
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In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in entre-
preneurism.  While some draw a distinction between entrepre-
neurism and innovation, the combination of entrepreneurial activ-
ity and innovation are considered the major factors behind long-
term economic growth.47  This interest is manifesting itself in 
many ways.  States are focusing their economic development ef-
forts on supporting entrepreneurism rather than using tax credits 
to attract industry from other states and countries.48  They are in-
vesting in state-sponsored venture capital programs49 and estab-
lishing business accelerators and incubators in strategic loca-
tions.50  Colleges and universities across the country are 
establishing formal programs and offering degrees in entrepre-
neurship.51  They are collaborating on local and regional eco-
nomic development efforts that focus on innovation.52  University 
researchers are encouraged to commercialize the inventions that 
they create through their basic research.53 
in comparison to the $105.9 billion in investments made in 2000. See METRICK & YASUDA, 
supra note 40, at 13. 
47. See Ahlstrom, supra note 10, at 16.
48. See generally Entrepreneurship’s Role in Economic Development, KAUFFMAN
FOUNDATION: ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY DIGEST (June 11, 2014), http://www.kauff-
man.org/~/ media/ kauffman_org/ resources/ 2014/ entrepreneurship%20policy%20di-
gest/june%202014/entrepreneurship_policy_digest_june_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJY3-
RVAG].  
49. See DON GRAVES & CLIFTON G. KELLOGG, Foreword to INFORMATION AND
OBSERVATIONS ON STATE VENTURE CAPITAL PROGRAMS (2013).  While the State Small 
Business Credit Initiative is one example, the Department of Treasury “manages a large port-
folio of programs and fiscal policies intended to strengthen the U.S. Economy . . . .”  ERIC 
CROMWELL & DAN SCHMISSEUR, INFORMATION AND OBSERVATIONS ON STATE VENTURE 
CAPITAL PROGRAMS 1 (2013).  
50. See CROMWELL & SCHMISSEUR, supra note 49, at 12; see, e.g., INCITE CO-
INVESTMENT FUND, LAUNCH TENNESSEE, http://launchtn.org/investors/capital/incite/ 
[https://perma.cc/WB5V-R7A7]. But see STATE VENTURE CAPITAL PROGRAMS, supra note 
49, at 1-2 n.1 (describing how 30 states participate in SSBCI and that California and Massa-
chusetts do not use SSBCI capital for state venture capital programs).
51. See OFFICE OF INNOVATION & ENTREPRENEURSHIP ECON. DEV. ADMIN., U.S. 
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE INNOVATIVE AND ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY: HIGHER 
EDUCATION, INNOVATION & ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN FOCUS 10 (2013),  https:// 
www.eda.gov /pdf /The_ Innovative_ and_ Entrepreneurial_University_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C7X7-FRWS]. 
52. Id. at 17.
53. The Department of Commerce has established programs to “nurture innovation,
commercialization, and entrepreneurship among students, faculty, alumni, and within their 
communities.”  Id. at 9. 
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In sharp contrast, a recent Gallup article discusses the fact 
that since 2008 there have been more net business closures than 
start-ups.54  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, “the 
level of entrepreneurship actually has declined in recent years.”55  
While there can be a wide array of explanations for such an oc-
currence, the fact remains that since 1977 there has been a signif-
icant decline in the number of start-up businesses created in the 
U.S.56  Recent studies suggest that the challenge of obtaining cap-




The modern business entity form of venture capital only 
dates back to 1946, when Georges Doriot created American Re-
search and Development Corporation (ARDC) to help fund entre-
preneurial firms by those who did not have wealthy friends or 
family and could not obtain traditional bank financing.58  During 
its 25-year existence, ARDC generated 15.8% annualized returns 
54. Clifton, supra note 7.  “[T]he number of self-employed in the U.S. has dropped
notably.  Incorporated self-employed fell from 5.78 million in 2008 to 5.13 million in 2011.  
It climbed back to 5.64 million in 2016.  So, after eight years, the number of incorporated 
self-employed remains well short of the 2008 level.”  Facts & Data on Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship, SMALL BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP COUNCIL, http://sbecouncil.org/about-
us/facts-and-data/ [https://perma.cc/B8UE-6ZL9].  
55.  Facts & Data on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, supra note 54.  Even with 
declining entrepreneurship in America, small businesses still comprise up to 97.9% of na-
tionwide firms.  Id. 
56. See Clifton supra note 7 (containing a graph of U.S. Census Bureau Business Dy-
namics Statistics displaying a gradual and significant decline from 1977 to the present). 
57. See BABSON, THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS IN AMERICA 2016 9 (2016),
http://www.babson.edu/ executive-education/ expanding-entrepreneurship/ 10k-small-busi-
ness /Documents /goldman-10ksb-report-2016.pdf. [https://perma.cc/3XQD-XZVY].  The 
Babson report summarizes insights collected through a survey administered to over 1,800 
small business owners across the country, and examines challenges and opportunities facing 
established small businesses around four main themes: (1) access to capital; (2) the regula-
tory environment; (3) workforce; and (4) technology.  See id. at 6. 
58. METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 10.  Unlike modern venture capital funds
which are typically limited partnerships, ARD was organized as a corporation and was pub-
licly traded.  Id. at 10-11.  Recorded venture capital activity dates back to 640 B.C., when 
Aristotle wrote about Thales, a Phoenician who purchased olive-oil presses in the winter 
when they were cheap and gained a considerable return during the more active winter season. 
See THE FIRST VENTURE CAPITALISTS: GEORGES DORIOT ON LEADERSHIP, CAPITAL, & 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, at XIII (Udayan Gupta ed., 2004).  
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for its investors, a standard for generating this type of returns that 
still exists today.59  Such a return was heavily dependent on one 
primary “home run” investment in Digital Equipment Corpora-
tion (DEC).60  DEC was founded by two MIT engineers who 
“wanted to make computers smaller, cheaper and easier to use.”61  
In return for ARDC’s $70,000 investment and Doriot’s strategic 
guidance, ARDC received 70% of the stock in DEC.62  Fearing 
that DEC would fall into hostile hands when he retired, he ar-
ranged for a buyout in 1972, where DEC shares were passed on 
to the ARDC investors.63  ARDC sold its holdings to a much 
larger corporation with ARDC’s interest in DEC shares valued at 
$450 million.64 
During his tenure with ARDC, Doriot funded over a hundred 
different technology based start-ups in a wide range of industries 
from healthcare to telecommunications.  He and his associates 
would use their academic credentials to scour labs for austronau-
tical and military funded government research which had poten-
tial for civilian-commercial applications.65  Doriot relied heavily 
on the character of the entrepreneur when deciding on what com-
panies to invest in.66  He stuck with these companies for the long-
term, and believed that “profit was a byproduct of hard work and 
commitment, but not the endpoint.”67  Indeed, much of his suc-
cess as a Harvard Business School professor and as a venture cap-
italist is attributed to his personal involvement with his students’ 
and individuals whose companies he invested in.68 
59. METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 10.
60. Id.  “Excluding the $70,000 investment in their biggest ‘home run’, the Digital
Equipment Corporation, ARD[C]’s 25-year annualized performance drops to 7.4 percent.”  
Id. 
61. Andrew Beattie, Georges Doriot and The Birth of Venture Capital, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://investopedia.com/articles/financialcareers/10/georges-doriot-venture-capital.asp 
[perma.cc/SG5E-MKC8].   
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.  Doriot later regretted the decision to sell to a larger corporation.  Id.  He felt
that the larger corporate culture and impersonal management hampered DEC’s flexibility. 
Id.  
65. Beattie, supra note 61.
66. See id.
67.  Id.  As a Harvard Business School professor, Doriot prided himself on instilling in 
his students the value of an “honest day’s work.”  SPENCER E. ANTE, CREATIVE CAPITAL: 
GEORGES DORIOT AND THE BIRTH OF VENTURE CAPITAL 43, 47 (2008).   
68. Gupta, supra note 58, at XIV, XIX.
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ARDC’s success spurred others to create venture funds and 
“enter the venture capital field using Doriot’s model.”69  Many of 
these new venture capital firms were started by former students 
and ARDC employees.70  Doriot supported these efforts and be-
lieved that “as long as [start-ups] were subjected to selective rigor 
and . . . properly supported [,]” the more new ventures the bet-
ter.71  Doriot began to see the standards of some venture capital 
firms drop as they focused on realizing “quick profit from [initial 
public offerings] rather than building a company.”72  In a 1971 
letter to ARDC shareholders, Doriot wrote “[v]enture capital 
seems to have shifted from a constructive, difficult task to a new 
method of speculation.”73 
Recognizing the need for additional capital for small start-
ups beyond what the private equity market was providing, Con-
gress passed the Small Business Act of 1958.74  This act created 
the Small Business Administration (SBA) and subsequently the 
Small Business Development Companies (SBICs).75  SBICs are 
privately owned investment companies that are licensed and reg-
ulated by the Small Business Administration to provide venture 
capital to small independent businesses.76  SBICs have various 
investment philosophies, most provide long-term loans to quali-
fied small businesses, but some more aggressive firms make eq-
uity-participation loans.77  There are currently over 290 licensed 
69. Beattie, supra note 61.
70. Id.  Because of the public status of ARDC, Doriot was unable to compensate his
employees with options on those start-up companies that they were building.  See ANTE, 
supra note 67, at 65. 
71. Beattie, supra note 61.
72. Id.
73. Gupta, supra note 58, at 51.
74.  Small Business Act, Pub. L. No. 85-536 67 Stat. 232 (1958); METRICK & YASUDA,
supra note 40, at 10-11. 
75. METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 11.
76. U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, https://www.sba.gov /offices /head-
quarters /ooi /resources /4905 [https://perma.cc/L3VM-NXDR].  “Only companies defined 
by SBA as ‘small’ are eligible for SBIC financing.”  Id.  “Generally, the SBIC Program 
defines a company as ‘small’ when its net worth is $18.0 million or less and its average after 
tax net income for the prior two years does not exceed $6.0 million.”  Id.  
77. Small Business Investment Companies (SBIC), INC., https://www.inc.com/ency-
clopedia/small-business-investment-companies-sbic.html [https://perma.cc/B7GU-KGNU].  
“SBICs . . . [can] range from limited partnerships to subsidiaries of multinational corpora-
tions.”  Id.  “For banks, establishment of an SBIC subsidiary is often an attractive proposi-
tion, because it enables them to make small business investments that would otherwise be 
closed to them because of U.S. banking laws and requirements.”  Id.  Regardless of their 
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SBICs in existence across the country today.78  While SBICs did 
not immediately contribute a significant source of venture capital 
for start-ups, they eventually provided a valuable training ground 
for venture capitalists.79 
In the early 1960’s venture capital firms began organizing as 
limited partnerships.80  Venture capitalists served as general part-
ners and passive investors, while institutions such as pension 
funds, university endowments, and other entities served as the pri-
mary investors and limited partners.81  The limited partnership 
business-entity form offered two distinct advantages over the ven-
ture capital corporation.  It allowed the venture fund to take ad-
vantage of the pass through taxation feature of the partnership, 
while providing the limited partners with the liability protection 
offered to corporations.82  Additionally, it allowed the general 
partners to craft a limited partnership agreement which vests them 
with substantial discretion to function in multiple roles within the 
company such as an officer, an advisor, and a source of funding 
while limiting their own personal liability to the fullest extent pos-
sible.83  The transformation to the limited partnership structure is 
business structure, “their ultimate goal is to realize a profit from their various business trans-
actions.”  Id.  Once SBA approved, SBICs can leverage funds at advantageous rates from the 
United States Treasury based upon the amount of private investment in the fund.  Id.  “Some 
SBICs make most of their revenue from straight debt financing, with their profit coming 
from the differential between the cost of borrowing from the SBA and the interest rate they 
charge the small business [borrower]” and  some make equity-participation loans.  Id.  Typ-
ically, SBICs are eligible to receive up to 300% of private equity raised. 13 C.F.R. § 
107.1150(a) (2017). 
78. U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, SBIC ANNUAL REPORT FY 1 (2014),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/SBICAnnualReport_FY2014_Final_508.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/J24S-BDLB].  “In FY 2014, SBA licensed 30 SBICs with over $1.3 billion 
in private investor capital . . . bringing the SBIC operating portfolio to 294 funds with $11.8 
billion in Private Capital and almost $10.7 billion in SBA outstanding leverage and commit-
ments for a total of $22.5 billion of capital under management.”  Id. at 2-3. 
79. See METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 11, 15.  “Since 1958, SBICs have
invested almost $60 billion in small U.S. companies . . . .”  The Steps to SBIC Financing, 
SMALL BUSINESS INVESTOR ALLIANCE, http://www.sbia.org /?page=sbic_financing 
[https://perma.cc/ZN42-LVWH].   
80. METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40 at 11; see also Martin Kenney & Richard
Florida, Venture Capital in Silicon Valley: Fueling New Firm Formation, in 
UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY: THE ANATOMY OF AN ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION 98, 
109 (Martin Kenney ed., 2000).  
81. David Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of
Contract, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 363, 366, 375 (2002). 
82. Id. at 376.
83. See id. at 382.
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viewed as one of “the . . . most important organizational innova-
tion[s] of the modern venture capital system.”84 
Perhaps the most significant policy change that impacted 
venture-capital investment occurred in 1979 when U.S. pension 
fund rules were relaxed to allow pension funds to invest in this 
asset class.85  With vast amounts of money to invest compared to 
the individual investor, pension funds soon began to dominate the 
venture capital market;86 in fact, pension funds presently “supply 
nearly half of all the money for [venture capital] in the United 
States.”87  Following a surge in venture capital investment after 
the relaxation of ERISA laws, growth in the venture capital in-
dustry “remained [relatively] stable throughout the 1980s.”88  
This growth continued through the first half of the 1990s, increas-
ing from $3 billion in 1983 to just over $4 billion in 1994.89 
In the late 1990s, the United States market experienced ex-
traordinary growth in internet and computer technology invest-
ments, and venture capitalists were there to share in the profit.90  
Venture capital investments in such companies were yielding 
spectacular returns, and institutional investors rushed in to partic-
ipate.91  Venture capital investments grew from a previous high 
of around $4 billion in the early 90s to an unprecedented level of 
$104 billion in 2000.92  This boom in venture capital investments, 
however, was short lived.  “The [stock market] crash and technol-
ogy slump that started in March 2000 shook virtually the entire 
venture capital industry as valuations for startup technology com-
panies collapsed.”93  Venture capital investments fell by nearly 
half from the fourth quarter of 2000 to the first quarter of 2001.94  
84. Id. at 365 (citation omitted).
85. METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 11.
86. Id. at 11-12.
87. Id. at 11.
88. Id. at 12.
89. Id.
90. See METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 12.
91. See id.  Investments rose to $11.0 billion in 1996, $14.7 billion in 1997, $20.9
billion in 1998, and $54.4 billion in 1999 before reaching an all-time high of $105.9 billion 
in 2000.  Id. at 12-13.  
92. Id. at 12.
93. M Maritha, et al., Role of Venture Capital in Indian Economy, 4 IOSR J. of BUS. 
& MGMT., Sept.-Oct. 2012, at 46, 51.  
94. See id.  “Although the post-boom years represent just a small fraction of the peak
levels of venture investment reached in 2000, they still represent an increase over the levels 
of investment from 1980 through 1995.”  Id. at 51. “[V]enture investment was 0.058% [of 
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During the post-boom period venture capital investments fluctu-
ated between $20 and $30 billion dollars a year95 until 2009 where 
activity steadily increased before reaching $58.8 billion in 2015.96 
B. The Limited Availability of Venture Capital 
The National Venture Capital Association recognizes 718 
venture capital firms in existence in 2015 with a total of over $165 
billion of capital under management.97  There were 3,709 compa-
nies funded in 2015, and 1,444 of those raised money for the first 
time.98  During this period, companies in 46 states received ven-
ture capital funding; however, 41% of the deals and 57% of the 
total funds invested were in California.99  Companies in Califor-
nia, New York, and Massachusetts were the beneficiaries of 78% 
of all such investments.100 
“An obstacle for supporting high-growth small businesses as 
a state economic development strategy is the supply of private 
sector equity investors, both in terms of the number of experi-
enced venture investors and the amount of capital available for 
venture investments.”101  As the above data indicates, “the supply 
and accessibility of privately managed venture capital is far more 
limited for small businesses located outside a small number of 
GDP] in 1994, peaked at 1.087% (nearly 19 times the 1994 level) in 2000 and ranged from 
0.164% to 0.182% in 2003 and 2004.”  Id.  “The revival of an Internet-driven environment 
in 2004 through 2007 helped to revive the venture-capital environment.”  Id.  “However, as 
a percentage of the overall private equity market, venture capital has still not reached its mid-
1990s level, let alone its peak in 2000.”  Id. 
95.  METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 13.  The years following 2000 are referred 
to as the post-boom period for venture capital.  Id. 
96. See 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 10-11.
97. Id. at 9.
98.  Id. at 9, 12.  Of the 3,709 companies funded, 2,620 were in information technology,
664 were in Medical/Health/Life Sciences and 425 were Non-High Technology industry 
groups.  Id. at 12.   
99. Id. at 9.
100.  See id. at 14. 
101.  PROGRAM EVALUATION OF THE US DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY STATE SMALL 
BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY 61 (2016) [hereinafter 
EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE], https://www.treasury.gov/ re-
source-center/ sb-programs/ Documents/ SSBCI%20 Program%20 Evaluation%20 
2016%20 -%20 Full%20 Report.pdf. [https://perma.cc/2BHA-2K2N].  
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geographic regions.”102  Given that most venture capitalists be-
come actively engaged with their portfolio companies,103 it is crit-
ical that the company is within reasonable commuting distance 
from the fund.104  As a result, the funded companies are often re-
quired to move closer to the funding source.105  Start-ups emanat-
ing from universities, government operations, and corporations 
outside these three states are developing valuable intellectual 
property, and entrepreneurs are seeking seed capital with which 
to commercialize such innovations.106  Economic development 
officials outside of traditional venture capital centers view such 
agglomeration of venture capital funding as a constraint on inno-
vation, stifling to such start-ups, as well as state economic devel-
opment efforts designed to foster the growth in state entrepreneur-
ial activities.107 
Within this macroeconomic context, an entrepreneur must 
also understand that “[f]or every 100 business plans that come to 
a venture capital firm for funding . . . only 10 or so get a serious 
102.  Id. 
103.  They usually accomplish this by taking a board seat and acting as strategic advi-
sors.  2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 6.  
104.  See Scott Shane, Why Venture Capital Deals Stay in Silicon Valley, 
ENTREPRENEUR.COM (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/252225 
[https://perma.cc/Q44A-A767].  “For example, since 2010, small businesses receiving 80 
percent of the $166 billion of venture capital investments were headquartered in fewer than 
1 percent of the U.S. counties.”  EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, su-
pra note 101, at 61 (citation omitted).  
105.  See Shane, supra note 104.  Observers of equity capital markets have noted that 
the “virtuous cycle” of venture-backed businesses located close to funding sources has also 
created a “vicious cycle” for regions with few venture capital firms actively investing in local 
businesses.  LERNER, supra note 4, at 6.  
106.  See generally 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42 (containing numerous graphic data 
displays).  According to the State Science and Technology Institute (SSTI), three of the pri-
mary elements of an innovation or technology-based economy include intellectual infrastruc-
ture, an entrepreneurial culture, and investment capital.  See A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR 
TECHNOLOGY-BASED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: POSITIONING UNIVERSITIES AS DRIVERS 
FOSTERING ENTREPRENEURSHIP INCREASING ACCESS TO CAPITAL, STATE SCIENCE & 
TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE 7 (2006) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE], http://ssti.org/sites/de-
fault/files/resourceguidefortbed.pdf. [https://perma.cc/5T3C-8WTH].  
107.   See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 106, at 7, 13.  Research has shown that young, 
high-growth businesses contribute disproportionately to job growth and positive spillover 
effects for regional economies.  See Haltiwanger et al., Who Creates Jobs? Small vs. Large 
vs. Young 9-10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 16300, 2010), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16300.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZVD-UFS8].  
568 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  70:3 
look, and only one ends up being funded.”108  “The venture capi-
tal firm looks at the “management team, the concept, the market-
place, fit to the fund’s objectives, the value-added potential for 
the firm, and the capital needed to build a successful business.”109  
The reality is that most start-ups do not qualify for venture capital 
and likely never will.  Most venture capitalists invest only in fast-
growing ventures that have a proven record of accomplishment. 
This reduces the risk of poor fund performance.110  The ultimate 
objective of venture capital funds is to invest in start-up compa-
nies and obtain a high rate of return in the shortest time frame 
possible.111  This is typically accomplished through merger and 
acquisition or through an initial public offering in the security 
markets.112 
Given this focus on speedy monetization, there are a number 
of reasons why entrepreneurs may not choose to access venture 
capital.  Many first-time entrepreneurs can be confused over who 
the real customer is in a venture capital transaction.113  Under the 
typical venture capital model the investors are limited partners 
who supply 99% of the fund’s capital.114  The general partners 
supply 1% of the capital and receive an annual management fee 
of 2% of the value of the fund.115  The general partners decide 
which start-ups to invest in and when such investments should be 
liquidated.  The most common profit-sharing arrangement is an 
108.  2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 6.  
109.  Id. at 6-7.  
110.  Growth stage companies received the highest percentage of investment in 2015. 
2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 26.  
111.  METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 3.  The typical fund is set up for a ten-
year life.  Id. at 16.  “Historically, after the [tenth] year, only a few companies that typically 
do not have huge upside potential remain in the portfolios.”  Id. at 20.  “But the slow pace of 
exits in recent years has resulted in a number of good, mature companies remaining in port-
folios well past the nominal 10-year mark.”  Id.  “Life science funds tend to have lives two 
years longer than typical technology funds.”  Id.  The median initial public offering of a fund 
in this analysis is 14.17 years.  Id.   
112.  2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 6.  I will refer to investors in venture capital 
funds as investors.  While the venture capitalists running those funds are also investors in the 
start-up firms, I will refer to them simply as venture capitalists.  The term entrepreneurs and 
founders are used interchangeably.  The innovation-intensive start-ups being financed will 
be referred to as start-ups or portfolio companies, or simply, the venture. 
113.  See id. at 7. 
114.  Diane Mulcahy, Venture Capitalists Get Paid Well to Lose Money, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Aug. 5, 2014, https://hbr.org/2014/08/venture-capitalists-get-paid-well-to-lose-money 
[https://perma.cc/3PVP-6ZFY].  
115.  See id. 
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80/20 split, where after returning all the original investment to the 
limited partners, the general partner keeps 20% of the fund’s 
profit and distributes 80% to the limited partners.116  This com-
pensation structure, known as Carried Interest, is taxed at the re-
duced rate applicable to the capital gain rate and is the incentive 
that makes private equity so enticing for investment profession-
als.117 
Once this model is understood, it becomes clear that the ven-
ture-capital-funds customers are the general partner(s) and inves-
tors, and the entrepreneur and the start-up company is the product 
that is partially acquired, nurtured, and ultimately sold for a profit. 
The typical venture investee will be a company that has large 
growth potential over a short period of time.  Only about “three 
percent of all businesses can be classified as high growth busi-
nesses” that venture capitalists typically target.118  Within the sub-
set of high-growth businesses, venture companies largely target 
established or rapidly growing companies rather than early-stage 
or seed companies.119  In fact, most venture capital funding “is 
going to large, late-stage companies including ‘unicorns,’ which 
are private companies valued at $1 billion or more.”120  Those 
“unicorns” accounted for most of the available VC funding in 
early 2016, comprising $40 billion in the first half of 2016 out of 
the $79 billion total invested.121 
C. The Conflicts of Interest Inherent in Venture 
Capital 
116.  See id. 
117.  See Todd Hixon, An Insider Perspective On Carried Interest, FORBES (Feb. 2, 
2012, 1:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/toddhixon/2012/02/02/an-insider-perspective-
on-carried-interest/#5f4a49b56b0a [https://perma.cc/4D8B-A5HU].  
118.  Karen Mills, The 4 Types of Small Businesses, and Why Each One Matters, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Aug. 30, 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/04/the-4-types-of-small-businesses-
and-why-each-one-matters [https://perma.cc/NDJ5-XKV7].  
119.  Lizette Chapman, Unicorns Snag Most Venture Capital in First Half of 2016, 
BLOOMBERG (July 8, 2016, 7:16 p.m.), https://www.bloomberg.com /news /articles /2016-
07-07 /unicorns- snag- most- venture- capital- in- first- half- of -2016 
[https://perma.cc/3XM8-KGWE]. 
120.  Id. 
121.  Id. 
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Once the fund is raised, the venture capitalist begins the pro-
cess of acquiring an interest in an attractive start-up.  Many first-
time entrepreneurs dream of the day that they hit it big and get a 
venture capital firm to back their new start-up.  After all, that is 
how the likes of Apple, Microsoft, Google, and Starbucks got 
their start.122  However, most novice entrepreneurs are unaware 
of the dynamics of entering into a contractual relationship with a 
venture capital firm and are blind to the potential conse-
quences.123  There are inherent conflicts of interest between the 
entrepreneur and the venture capital firm.  The most obvious is 
the one that everyone knows from Shark Tank.  The entrepreneur 
wants to get the most money from the investor while giving up 
the smallest share of the company; the investor wants the oppo-
site.  The venture capitalist has an advantage here, because the 
venture capitalist has wide experience in valuing companies and 
a staff of analysts to help with the job. 
Often, venture capital contracts can have problems embed-
ded at their inception.  During the negotiations stage, the relative 
imbalance of bargaining power can influence the valuation of the 
start-up company and the contractual rights of the parties.124  
“Venture capital contracts are [largely] non-negotiable”125 and 
the terms are favorably drafted to protect the interests of the fund 
and provide the venture capitalist with as much control as possible 
over the portfolio company.126  In addition, if there are no other 
sources of financing, the start-up has little leverage in negotiating 
the amount of equity it must give up to the venture capitalist for 
the necessary financing. 
While it may appear that such contracts are patently unfair 
to the entrepreneur, one must consider the amount of risk that the 
122.  See 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42 at 7.  
123.  Andy Heughebaert & Sophie Manigart, Firm Valuation in Venture Capital Fi-
nancing Rounds: The Role of Investor Bargaining Power, 39 J. BUS. FIN. & ACC. 500, 505-
06 (2012) (citations omitted), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1729773 
[https://perma.cc/8GAH-H4JW]; see also Yrjö Koskinen, et. al., Private Information and 
Bargaining Power in Venture Capital Financing, 3 (2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=891192 
[https://perma.cc/3PY7-LR9J].  
124.  Heughebaert & Manigart, supra note 123; see also Yrjö Koskinen, et. al., supra 
note 123. 
125.  See Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Sur-
vival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 55 n.16 (2002).  
126.  Id. at 61 (stating that venture capitalist are permitted to “keep a ‘tight leash’ on 
entrepreneurs”).   
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investors are taking in such speculative investments, and the fidu-
ciary duties the general partners of the venture capital firm owe 
their limited partners when they make these investments127  Fail-
ure rates for start-ups are between 30 and 95% depending on how 
failure is defined.128  The agreements are designed to give the 
general partners the most flexibility possible to navigate between 
what is in the best interest of the fund versus what is in the best 
interest of the portfolio company.  However, as a practical matter, 
the way the venture capital compensation structures are set up, the 
incentives clearly favor the interests of the fund.129 
The general partners or their agents will typically take seats 
on the board of the portfolio companies to ensure oversight over 
the start-up.130  Operational conflicts often arise from infor-
mation-asymmetry problems, where both the entrepreneur and the 
venture capitalist are in possession of specialized information 
which was not uncovered during due diligence or contemplated 
in the agreement.131  Furthermore, the founders and venture cap-
italist will often have differing expectations and interests in the 
transaction and conflicts arise from these divergences.132 
127.  See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the 
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003) (“The special character of ven-
ture capital contracting is shaped by the fact that investing in early stage, high technology 
companies presents [uncertainty, information asymmetry, and opportunism] in an extreme 
form.”); George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68 
U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 311-12 (2001) (observing that financial contracting is more difficult in 
venture capital than in bank lending). 
128.  See Carmen Nobel, Why Companies Fail—and How Their Founder Can Bounce 
Back, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL (Mar. 7, 2011), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/why-compa-
nies-failand-how-their-founders-can-bounce-back [https://perma.cc/UGX3-65NU].  Shikhar 
Ghosh, a senior lecturer at Harvard Business School, estimates that if failure means liquidat-
ing all assets, with investors losing all or most of their investment, then the failure rate for 
start-ups is 30 to 40%.  If failure is defined as failing to meet projected return on investment, 
the failure rate is between 70 and 80%.  If failure is defined as failing to meet a previously 
declared projection, then the failure rate is between 90 and 95%.  Id.   
129.  See Heughebaert & Manigart, supra note 123, at 506.   
130.  See Utset, supra note 125, at 61.   
131.  See Zsuzsanna Fluck, et. al., Venture Capital Contracting and Syndication: An 
Experiment in Computational Corporate Finance, 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 11624, 2005) (citation omitted), http://www.nber.org/papers/w11624 
[https://perma.cc/6DWW-GCL3].  Information asymmetry plays a crucial role in the venture 
industry because the founder will often possess much greater knowledge of the product or 
products while the venture investor possesses business acumen and market knowledge.  See 
Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 488 (2012). 
132.  See JUAN LI & JAN TONY ABRAHAMSSON, NEW MONEY, NEW PROBLEMS: A 
QUALITATIVE STUDY OF THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN VENTURE CAPITALISTS AND 
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Because of the potential conflicts that arise during the matu-
ration process, the parties in the venture transaction sometimes 
resort to obstructionist measures to further their individual goals 
at the expense of the company or the venture itself.133  For exam-
ple, the general partners will structure the investment in the port-
folio company by taking preferred shares “with significant liqui-
dation preferences and redemption rights, [which] ‘puts them in a 
superior position to common stockholders’—i.e. the founder in 
liquidation or acquisition.”134  One of the ways that venture capi-
talist can usurp company control from the founders is through 
wash-out financing.135  When venture capitalist undergo a round 
of wash-out financing, the new issuance drastically dilutes the 
ownership of the founders and the venture capitalists are able to 
take control of the company.136 
Once the venture capitalist has obtained majority control, the 
venture capitalist may continue nurturing the company until it can 
be brought to market, but they may also “dissolve the company 
and salvage what it can,”—meaning selling the portfolio-com-
pany’s assets in an effort to break even.137  If the venture capitalist 
ENTREPRENEURS IN SWEDEN 23 (2011) (noting a Swedish market study where conflicts most 
often arise out of differing expectations and objectives), http://www.diva-portal.org /smash 
/get/diva2:426612/FULLTEXT01 [https://perma.cc/VAZ3-NKES]. 
133.  See Utset, supra note 125, at 117 n.236.  Utset believes that the relative depend-
ence on the entrepreneur’s remaining in the venture can cause the entrepreneur to take com-
pany-harming actions due to the often VC-favorable contract provisions.  Id.  
134.  Vladimir Atanasov, et. al., The Impact of Litigation on Venture Capitalist Repu-
tation, 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Paper No. 13641, 2007) http://www.nber.org/pa-
pers/w13641 [https://perma.cc/3JXJ-QSAX]; see José M. Padilla, What’s Wrong with a 
Washout?: Fiduciary Duties of the Venture Capitalist Investor in a Washout Financing, 1 
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L. J. 269, 274 (2001); see also Utset, supra note 125, at 51 (“[V]enture 
capitalists structure transactions so as to retain control.  Among other things, control gives 
venture capitalists the ability to freely maneuver during the venture, including the ability to 
dismiss entrepreneurs when their services are no longer deemed valuable . . . .”). 
135.  Padilla, supra note 134, at 276.  Practically speaking, however, washouts are 
“excruciating” and “ugly.”  Paul Jones, Startup Finance: A VC’s Thoughts on Wash Out 
Rounds, TECHNORI (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.technori.com /2013/04/4114-startup-fi-
nance-a-vcs-thoughts-on-wash-out-rounds/  [https://perma.cc/8ZMW-BEKJ]. 
136.  See John R. LeClaire, et. al., WatchMark Ruling Clarifies Pay-To-Play, 
VENTURE CAPITAL JOURNAL 64 (Mar. 2005).  
137.  Utset, supra note 125, at 57, 65 (“Intangible assets like intellectual property are 
harder to value and sell to third parties.”); see also Ralph Bachmann & Ibolya Schindele, 
Theft and Syndication in Venture Capital Finance 1, 3 (2006), https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=896025 [https://perma.cc/3TPE-TGPW] (stating that “[v]enture capitalists hold port-
folios of projects, which provides them with the opportunities and the incentives to apply 
ideas or technologies developed by one entrepreneur in other projects.”).  
2017 FOSTERING INNOVATION 573 
takes the latter course, they salvage some or all of their initial in-
vestment, but in doing so they take away any chance for the port-
folio company to succeed, thereby assuring that the founders will 
get nothing for all the time, money, and hard work they put into 
the business. 
In many ventures, the primary asset of the portfolio company 
is its intellectual property, which the venture investor can either 
sell to third parties or incorporate into its other portfolio compa-
nies which are being financed through the fund.138  Because 
founders typically only contribute human capital and intellectual 
property to the venture,139 much of their continued managerial in-
volvement depends on future product developments.  The tacit 
knowledge of the intellectual property possessed by the founders 
can play an important role in how successful the products are or 
how services perform in the marketplace.140  Withholding such 
information is the only real obstructionist behavior that the entre-
preneur can undertake to retaliate against the opportunistic behav-
ior of the venture capitalist.  Due to the contractual protections 
contained in the venture capital agreement, the founder is limited 
in its self-serving actions.141 
The only real alternative that an aggrieved entrepreneur has 
is to take legal action.  However, an entrepreneur that is seeking 
outside funding to promote their start-up, will likely not have the 
financial ability to support litigation.  Again, because the venture 
capital agreements are largely drafted to protect the interests of 
the venture capitalist, pursuing such an option is rarely beneficial. 
An example of how such investor-favorable provisions play out 
in an action of this nature is reflected in the Delaware case In re 
Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation; here, a founder unsuccess-
fully attempted to sue based on an investor’s supposed breach of 
fiduciary duty by utilizing their liquidation preference.142  Courts 
138.  See Utset, supra note 125, at 57.  
139.  See id.  
140.  Brian K. Krumm, University Technology Transfer - Profit Centers or Black 
Holes: Moving Toward a More Productive University Innovation Ecosystem Policy, 14 NW. 
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 191 (2016).  
141.  Utset, supra note 125, at 57.  Utset describes how entrepreneurs facing dismissal 
or liquidation may engage in “hold-up” behavior to cease development of the product.  Id. 
A study of VC-involved litigation showed that founder claims usually center around fraud 
and 94% of trials end in victory for the VC.  See Atanasov et al., supra note 134, at 21. 
142.  73 A.3d 17, 20, 33-34 (Del. Ch. 2013).  While Trados is one example of VC 
litigation, there are several others.  See generally Encite LLC v. Soni, No. 2476-VCG, 2011 
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will generally give effect to the terms of the venture agreement 
because the contracts reflect the exchange of the venture capital-
ist’s added value for such control provisions.143  In reality, the 
best protection an entrepreneur has in this process is evaluating 
the venture capitalist’s reputation prior to entering into such 
agreements.144  The industry tends to monitor itself and those ven-
ture capital firms that have a history of opportunistic or predatory 
actions toward their portfolio companies can be uncovered during 
the due diligence process.145 
While such disputes may prove the exception rather than the 
rule, the relationship proves to be most successful when all of the 
parties’ interests are aligned.146  When working effectively, the 
venture capital model has produced unprecedented results in 
bringing innovative products and services to market.147  Such 
market successes are only partially attributable to the capital con-
tributions made to the venture, and perhaps to an even greater ex-
tent it is the value added services that the venture firms provide 
that make the difference.148  “Although [such activities are] an 
important part of the bargain between the venture capitalists and 
the entrepreneur, they are rarely specified” in venture capital con-
tracts.149 
WL 5920896 (Del. Ch. Nov. 28, 2011) (describing governance disputes arising in the course 
of a venture); see, e.g., In re Nine Sys. Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 3940-VCN, 2014 WL 
4383127, at *34 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014) (describing the litigation challenges with “fair deal-
ing and fair price” issues); Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 1, 1997) (the court found no breach of good faith when common stock holders received 
no consideration in a merger); Casanaro v. Bloodhound Techsm Inc., 65 A.3d 618, 637 (Del. 
Ch. 2013) (describing the application of the business judgment rule in obtaining control of 
the company). 
143.  See David Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships: A Study in Free-
dom of Contract, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 363, 367-68 (2002).  
144.  See Atanasov, et. al., supra note 134, at 2, 4.   
145.  Id. at 4.   
146.  See 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 7-8. 
147.  Id. at 6.   
148.  See TERTTU LUUKKONEN, ET. AL, IMPORTANCE OF THE NON-FINANCIAL VALUE 
ADDED OF GOVERNMENT AND INDEPENDENT VENTURE CAPITALISTS 3 
(KESKUSTELUAIHEITA DISCUSSION PAPERS, 2011), https://www.etla.fi/wp-content/up-
loads/2012/09/dp1257.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7P8-2C2H].  
149.  D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 134 (1998). 
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D. Venture Capital’s Value Enhancing Activities 
When entrepreneurs enter into business with active investors 
they receive a boost in capital from the firm to evolve into the 
next step in its life cycle.  More importantly, however, they re-
ceive non-monetary assistance from the active investor.  Venture 
capitalists provide much more than money to the venture, they 
nurture the enterprise in hopes of increasing the value of its hold-
ings.150  The venture capitalist can serve as a networking tool, in-
troduce the founders to new areas of the venture industry, proffer 
financial alternatives, legitimize the firm, and coach the firm to 
success. 
While the organizational structure of venture capital firms 
take on many different forms, in many respects they resemble a 
consulting firm.  The senior personnel in the hierarchy are the 
general partners or managing directors.  They make the final in-
vestment decisions and sit on the board of directors of the portfo-
lio companies.151  Principals or directors are generally next in 
line, followed by associates and analysts who perform a range of 
duties that include performing due diligence, monitoring existing 
investments, and evaluating prospective investments.152  Some 
firms have venture partners or operating partners, entrepreneurs 
who have a part time relationship with the firm.  In some firms, 
operating partners take an active role in managing the investment 
in the portfolio company as chairman or director.153  Some firms 
have entrepreneurs in residence who work with the firm while 
looking for their next entrepreneurial venture and assist the firm 
with due diligence, introductions, and networking during the res-
idence.154 
The venture capitalist’s role in the transaction is to “provide 
advice, guidance and even supervision to the firms in their port-
folios.” 155  This financial, administrative, marketing, strategy, 
150.  Rosenburg, supra note 143, at 364. 
151.  JEFFREY BUSSGANG, MASTERING THE VC GAME 50 (2011).   
152.  Id. at 50-51; BRAD FELD & JASON MENDELSON, VENTURE DEALS:  BE SMARTER 
THAN YOUR LAWYER AND VENTURE CAPITALIST 7 (2d ed. 2013). 
153.  FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 152, at 7. 
154.  Id. at 7-8; BUSSGANG, supra note 151, at 53-54; ANDREW ROMAS, THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BIBLE TO VENTURE CAPITAL:  INSIDE SECRETS FROM THE LEADERS OF 
THE STARTUP GAME 67 (2013).   
155.  Rosenburg, supra note 143 at 364. 
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and management support – or “coaching” – is usually lacking in 
“young innovative firms operating in high-tech industries.”156  
Scholars note that the active nature of venture capitalist involve-
ment gives investees competitive advantage over passive-investor 
firms.157  And it is common for venture funds to communicate 
daily with their startups to grow and build the company.158  Even-
tually, the venture capitalist will help mold the company’s busi-
ness model and help recruit talent to work towards high-yield exit 
strategies.159 
While venture capitalists offer the entrepreneur technical 
and commercial advice, they also expand the entrepreneur’s net-
work.160  Venture capital networks “facilitate the sharing of infor-
mation, contacts, and resources” among other venture capital 
firms and can “improve the chances of securing follow-on VC 
funding for portfolio companies, and may indirectly provide ac-
cess to other VC’s relationships with service providers . . . .”161  
In fact, a “VC’s network centrality has a positive and significant 
effect on the probability that a portfolio company survives to a 
subsequent funding round or exits successfully.”162  Further, 
firms may specialize in specific markets and can provide other-
wise unavailable insight to the investee company.163 
Venture capital firms also provide unapparent value to the 
transaction by legitimizing the firm, focusing the firm on key ac-
tivities, and preventing distraction.164  Because venture capital 
firms act as an intermediary between the investors and the inves-
156.  See LUUKKONEN, ET. AL, supra note 148, at 3.  
157.  See Rosenberg, supra note 143, at 367. 
158.  2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 6. 
159.  Id.  
160.  LI & ABRAHAMSSON, supra note 132, at 14.  
161.  Yael V. Hochberg, et. al, Whom You Know Matters: Venture Capital Networks 
and Investment Performance, 62 J. FIN. 251, 252 (2007).  
162.  Id. at 253. 
163.  See LI & ABRAHAMSSON, supra note 132, at 18-19. 
164.  See id. at 18.  See also Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have 
Taught Us About Venture Capital Contracting 3 (Stan. L. Sch. Program L. & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 221, 2001).  Value-added services can be as important as financial capital. eBay, 
for instance, was a profitable start-up that did not require outside funding.  Yet it sought 
venture capital, which was provided by Benchmark Partners, in recognition that a venture 
capitalist’s connections and expertise would be essential in securing a seasoned CEO and 
other executives.  RANDALL E. STROSS, eBOYS:  THE TRUE STORY OF THE SIX TALL MEN 
WHO BACKED EBAY, WEBVAN, AND OTHER BILLION-DOLLAR START-UPS 22 (2002). 
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tees, their selection of a fund for investment confirms the inves-
tee’s quality internally to the entrepreneur and externally through 
reputational validation.165  Opposed to other financing methods, 
venture capital equity investments (by their nature) do not impose 
continual costs like debt financing does.166  Venture capitalists 
will also likely hire human resources consultants to recruit along 
with optimal staffing for the venture.167  In addition, venture cap-
italists can provide management advice to founders who lack 
managerial skills.168 
Thanks to these non-monetary benefits, venture-backed 
companies have an advantage over their passive-investor and 
non-investor counterparts regarding sales growth, employee 
growth, professionalization, time to market, technology strategy 
selection, likelihood of public offering, risk of underpricing IPOs, 
and post-IPO survival.169 
III. ANGELS—THE OTHER PRIVATE EQUITY
INVESTOR 
The term angel investors originated from Broadway Theater, 
where wealthy patrons would provide initial capital to get a new 
production off the ground in exchange for a share of the produc-
tions earnings.170  In 1978, William Wetzel, a professor at the 
University of New Hampshire and founder of the Center for Ven-
ture Research, studied how entrepreneurs raised seed capital and 
adopted the term “angel” to describe the individuals who invested 
165.  See Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
717, 749 (2010) (“[P]rivate VCs serve as reputational intermediaries, meaning that if the sig-
nals they send ae not credible, their reputation will suffer.”).   
166. Advantages and Disadvantages of Taking Venture Capital, 
MYTOPBUSINESSIDEAS, http :// www.mytopbusinessideas.com /advantages- venture- capi-
tal / [https://perma.cc/GMJ3-DZKW].  
167.  Id. 
168.  Id. 
169.  Venture Capital, KAUFFMAN FOUND. (June 15, 2016), http://www.kauffman.org 
/microsites/state-of-the-field/topics/finance/equity/venture-capital [https://perma.cc/X579-
7S5X].  
170.  Tom Britton, A Brief History of Angel Investing, SYNDICATE ROOM (Apr. 16, 
2015),https: //www.syndicateroom.com /learn /overview /angel-investing [https://perma.cc 
/83R5-XA3A].  
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in the venture.171  Angel investors are often retired executives or 
entrepreneurs themselves, looking for opportunities to make use 
of their experience and networks on a less than full time basis.172  
Unlike venture capital funds, angels invest their own money into 
the start-up.173  Often, potential return on the investment is not the 
only or even primary reason the angel is making the investment. 
Sometimes they invest for more altruistic reasons such as a desire 
to give back to the community, spur economic development, or 
simply the gratification of using their skills to develop and estab-
lish relationships with entrepreneurs.174 
The typical angel investor is looking for many of the same 
attributes in a start-up as is a venture capitalist when investing. 
However, they are willing to provide funding when the start-up is 
in the earliest stage of development and before there is enough of 
a reputation for venture funding to become interested.175  Angel 
investors provide value through mentorship and establishing later 
rounds of financing.176  Because angels typically invest in earlier 
financing rounds, their financial guidance provides uniquely ben-
eficial value to a young firm.177  In fact, raising additional capital 
is likely a service angels frequently provide.178  In addition to the 
financial benefit, the most effective growth value angels provide 
171.  See Jonathon Ortmans, The Rise of Angel Investing, KAUFFMAN FOUND. (Mar. 
28, 2016) http://www.kauffman.org/blogs/policy-dialogue/2016/march/the-rise-of-angel-in-
vesting [https://perma.cc/U88Y-ZE89].  
172.  See Angel Investor, ENTREPRENEUR, https://www.entrepreneur.com/ encyclope-
dia /angel-investor [https://perma.cc/E5GV-YHWG].  
173.  Ortmans, supra note 171.   
174.  Id.  
175.  See Jeffrey E. Sohl, The U.S. Angel and Venture Capital Market: Recent Trends 
and Developments, 6 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 7, 14 (2003) (“The [capital] gap ranges from 
$100,000 at the low end, the point at which the money raised from friends and families and 
bootstrapping runs out, to the $2 million range on the high end, the time when the venture 
would historically become attractive enough to catch the eye of venture fund investors.”). 
176.  Jess H. Chua & Zhenyu Wu, Value Added by Angel Investors through Post-In-
vestment Involvement: Exploratory Evidence and Ownership Implications, EUR. FIN. MGMT. 
ASS’N  1, 25-26 (OCT. 2009), http:// www.efmaefm.org /0EFMSYMPOSIUM /2010-Canada 
/papers/Value%20Added%20by%20Angel%20Investors%20through%20Post-Investment 
%20Involvement.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NMG-D6LS].  
177.  “[B]y investing in ventures at their earlier stage . . . when problems related to 
idea maturity, uncertainty, and legitimacy are more acute, angels may be able to add more 
value through their business expertise, industry experience, networks, and rapport with the 
entrepreneurs.” Id. at 7 (citations omitted).   
178.  Id. at 3. 
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concerns mentorship.179  Some believe monitoring activities act 
to spur firm growth, but studies have displayed that mentorship 
activities add more value to the firm’s overall growth.180 
Unlike the venture capitalists that employ comprehensive in-
vestment contracts to protect their investments, angel investing 
has traditionally been practiced in an informal fashion.181  Alt-
hough investing in start-ups is speculative at the earliest stages of 
the venture and subject to even greater information asymmetry 
and agency costs then the venture capitalists confront, the tradi-
tional angel enters into investment contracts that are both less 
complex and contain more entrepreneur-friendly terms.182 
One explanation for the use of simple investment contracts 
by the traditional angel investor is that their role is relationship-
driven.  The source of deal flow generally comes from trusted 
business associates which serves as an effective screening pro-
cess.183  Since angels actively participate in the development of 
the venture, “contractual monitoring rights and control mecha-
nisms used by venture capitalists” are unnecessary.184  Given the 
level of participation in the venture, there is also a need to estab-
lish and maintain trust in the working relationship between the 
parties.  Requiring an entrepreneur to enter into a venture capital-
like contract may send a signal of lack of trust in both the venture 
and entrepreneur.  Such angel-protective contracts risk the per-
ception that the angel lacks confidence in the start-up, and instead 
signals desire to limit financial loss, or extract a disproportionate 
share of financial gains.185  Overly detailed contracts may also 
suggest to the entrepreneur that the relationship may turn out to 
be more “combative than cooperative.”186 
In the mid-1990’s angels began to deviate from this informal 
approach to venture investing and began to invest with other ac-
credited investors187 in informal groups or in syndicates that are 
179.  Id. at 2.  
180.  Id. 
181.  Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. 
L. REV. 1405, 1407-08 (2008). 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id. at 1432. 
184.  Id. at 1433. 
185.  Id. at 1442. 
186.  Ibrahim, supra note 181, at 1441. 
187.  An angel typically qualifies as an “accredited investor” under the securities laws, 
which means it has over $1 million in net worth, or income over $200,000 in each of the last 
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formed within an organized angel network.  Angel investing has 
made a resurgence in recent years as a wider audience has been 
introduced to the concept of angel investing through the rise of 
accredited online platforms such as AngelList and SeedInvest, 
which offer new deal structures and connects entrepreneurs with 
angels electronically.188  Innovations in angel investing are speed-
ing up the deal process by synchronizing investment activities. 
two years (or $300,000 with spouse) and reasonably expects to reach the same income level 
in the current year.  17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2017). 
188.  AngelList and SeedInvest were the first two accredited platforms admitted to the 
Angel Capital Association.  See SeedInvest and AngelList are First Accredited Platforms 
Admitted to Angel Capital Association, SEEDINVEST: ANGEL GROUPS (Sept. 15, 2016), 
https://www.seedinvest.com /blog/ angel-groups /seedinvest-angellist-first-accredited-plat-
forms-admitted-angel-capital-association [https://perma.cc/X5GC-K3FS].  Angel List was 
founded in 2010 and aims to connect angel investors with tech startups over the internet.  
Nate C Hindman, Naval Ravikant, AngelList: A Social Network That Connects Startups with 
Investors, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 20, 2011), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/2011/09/20/naval-ravikant-angellist-startups-investors_n_966167.html [https: 
// perma.cc/N9XV-BCSH].  In addition, to providing a marketplace where start-ups can con-
nect with investors, AngelList also has a job marketplace that links up job seekers with 
startups hungry for new talent.  Kim-Mai Cutler, AngelList Raised $163M for Startups in 
2015, Up 56% Year-Over-Year, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 8, 2016), https://techcrunch.com /2016 
/02 /08 /angellist- raised- 163m -for -startups- in- 2015-up-56-year-over-year/. 
[https://perma.cc/23BD-6KPB].  In 2015, 548,000 “job matches” were made on the platform.  
Id.  Professional angel investors, along with any member, who have access to deal flow and 
a tremendous amount of experience can choose to lead a syndicate.  Syndicates, ANGELLIST: 
HELP (Aug. 15, 2016), https://angel.co /help /syndicates [https:// perma.cc/7AV5-A654].  In 
exchange, they get access to more investors for the deal and get carry.  Id.  Carry is a form 
of compensation to the head of the investment syndicate.  Simply put, it’s a percentage of 
the fund’s net profits.  Id.  The lead investor usually provides about 16% of the overall cap-
ital.  Salvador Briggman, AngelList vs SeedInvest, CROWDCRUX, http://www.crowd-
crux.com/angel-list-vs-seed-invest/. [https://perma.cc/L4GN-JQ46].  The start-up will get 
more capital with fewer investor interactions and back and forth communication with the 
lead investor.  Syndicates, ANGELLIST: HELP (Apr. 12, 2016), https://angel.co/help. 
[https://perma.cc/LDV2-SSNE].  Investors pay 0-25% deal carry to the lead of their syndi-
cate and 5% deal carry to AngelList Advisors, along with out-of-pocket costs.  Id.  There are 
no management fees.  Investors, ANGELLIST: HELP (Sept. 26, 2016), https://angel.co/help 
[https://perma.cc/HCP7-BVVV].  SeedInvest was launched in 2013 with “the mission to 
connect startups and investors online.”  Briggman, supra.  Most start-ups on SeedInvest are 
looking to raise between $100,000 – $50,000,000 and are technology or consumer-centric 
businesses. SEEDINVEST: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, https://www.seedin-
vest.com/faqs [https://perma.cc/GC7W-VUMD].  They should have already attracted a lead 
investor and set their funding terms.  Id.  The platform charges a 7.5% placement fee on the 
total amount raised, if successful, plus a 5% warrant coverage.  Id.  Warrant coverage is 
basically the option to buy more stock in the start-up at the price that was originally paid.  
See Warrant Coverage, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com /terms/w/warrantcov-
erage.asp [https://perma.cc/XY7Q-V5JZ].  “The placement fee is paid to North Capital or SI 
Securities, which are the website’s partner broker-dealers.”  Briggman, supra.  “[The start-
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Angel investing is more broadly available than venture cap-
ital to seed and early stage start-up companies.  According to the 
University of New Hampshire Center for Venture Research, there 
were 304,930 active angel investors in 2015.189  During this pe-
riod, angels invested $24.6 billion in 71,110 start-up companies, 
73% of which was seed or early financing.190  Compared to ven-
ture capital, angel investments are more widespread regionally; 
although California, New York and New England still attract 
40.4% of all investments.191  With the advent of online angel plat-
forms, funding opportunities can be pursued by remotely located 
entrepreneurs.  However, extending the reach of angel invest-
ments through such platforms may come at the expense of the 
professional interest and guidance provided by the traditional an-
gel. 
While group-angel investors still primarily focus on seed and 
early stage start-up financing, pooling investment resources al-
lows them to pursue larger investments at later stages of start-up 
development.192  However, pooling resources and the forming an-
gel groups change the traditional angel investment model.  Now 
that the angels are investing money with others, there is a need to 
employ more formalized screening and contracting mechanisms. 
Evidence suggests that “the more sophisticated angel groups” are 
moving toward adopting contracting terms like those found in 
up] should [also] expect up to $4,000 in due diligence, escrow, marketing and legal expense 
reimbursements.”  Id. 
189.  Jeffrey Sohl, The Angel Investor Market in 2015: A Buyers’ Market, UNH CTR. 
FOR VENTURE RESEARCH (May 25, 2015), https://paulcollege.unh.edu /sites /paulcol-
lege.unh.edu /files /cvr-reports /Full %20Year %202015 %20 Analysis %20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MD74-B3C9].  Although the size of angel investment market in the U.S. 
cannot be measured precisely (because many investments are made on an individual basis 
and therefore are not subject to disclosure rules), estimates indicate that the number of angel 
investment deals have far surpassed the number of venture capital investments.  Id.  (noting 
71,110 individual angel deals).  
190.  Sohl, supra note 189.  Angel investments in the seed and start-up stage were 28%; 
early stage investing was 45%; expansion financing 25%; and late stage investing 2% in 
2015.  Id.  “Software maintained its top sector position with 18% of total angel investments 
in 2015, followed by Healthcare Services/Medical Devices and Equipment (16%), Biotech 
(13%), Industrial/Energy (11%), Retail (10.6%), and Media (9%).”  Id. 
191.   2015 Annual Halo Report, ANGEL RESOURCE INSTITUTE, https:// angelre-
sourceinstitute.org /reports/ halo-report-full-version-ye-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JND-
49P6].  
192.  Ibrahim, supra note 181, at 1445. 
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venture capital contracts.193  Transitioning to this new angel in-
vestment model may diminish the unique relationship between 
the angel and entrepreneur and introduce some of the operational 
conflicts of interest found in the venture capital entrepreneur re-
lationship.  Essentially, angel investors are turning into venture 
capitalists in both form and substance. 
IV. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT POLICY INITIATIVES
DESIGNED TO ENHANCE INNOVATION FINANCE 
In an effort to expand the availability of start-up capital to 
small innovative businesses, federal policy makers have initiated 
programs that provide grants and loans and liberalize certain se-
curities regulations, making it easier for entrepreneurs to reach 
investors interested in purchasing equity in their start-up or other 
privately held small business.  The Small Business Innovation Re-
search (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) 
programs provide grants to encourage the commercialization of 
intellectual property developed through federally sponsored re-
search.194  The State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI) is 
designed to strengthen state programs that support private financ-
ing to small businesses.195  The program allows “states, territories 
and eligible municipalities . . . to build upon or create” successful 
small business financing programs.196  Perhaps the program that 
has the greatest potential for providing access to a new group of 
investors is the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), 
which was enacted to incentivize capital formation in the private 
market for small businesses by easing many of the country’s se-
curities regulations.197 
193.  Id. at 1447. 
194. About SBIR, SMALL BUSINESS INNOVATION RESEARCH, 
https://www.sbir.gov/about/about-sbir [https://perma.cc/Y6BL-66YE]; About STTR, SMALL 
BUSINESS INNOVATION RESEARCH, https://www.sbir.gov/about/about-sttr 
[https://perma.cc/9RJK-98P].  
195.  See State Small Business Credit Initiative: General Information, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sb-pro-
grams/Pages/ssbci-faqs.aspx#gen1 [https://perma.cc/EZ2X-RTV7]; State Small Business 
Credit Initiative (SSBCI), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treas-
ury.gov/resource-center/sb-programs/Pages/ssbci.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z84B-YT9].  
196.  State Small Business Credit Initiative: General Information, supra note 195. 
197.  Todd Blakeley Skelton, 2013 Jobs Acts Review & Analysis of Emerging Growth 
Company IPOs, 15 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 455, 456 (2014).   
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A. Small Business Innovation Research and Small 
Business Technology Transfer Programs 
The SBIR and STTR programs are, together, one of the larg-
est sources of early-stage technology venture financing.198  Since 
1982, the SBIR program has provided small businesses in the 
early stages of research and development with federal funding 
and support.199  Modeled after the SBIR program, the STTR pro-
gram was established ten years later as a sister program that pro-
motes cooperative research and development between small busi-
nesses and research institutions.200  The SBIR and STTR 
programs encourage US owned-and-operated small businesses to 
commercialize the scientific and technological innovations devel-
oped from federal research funds.201  While federal research fo-
cuses on discovering and fostering fundamental scientific 
knowledge, research and development attempts to translate that 
fundamental research into the development of new products and 
services.202  As a result, research and development shall greatly 
influence the advancement and development of industry as well 
as the national economy.203  Many small businesses do not have 
the necessary capital for conducting research and development 
programs and are competitively disadvantaged.204  The 
SBIR/STTR programs address this issue by investing federal 
funds in small businesses that would otherwise be unable to con-
duct research and development; thus, the SBIR/STTR programs 
lead to the commercialization of novel technological innovations 
and the stimulation of economic activity.205 
198.  What are SBIR and STTR Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES: 
NAT’L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH,  https://sbir.nih.gov/ [https://perma.cc/XKU8-LWYV].  
199.  Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-219, 96 
Stat. 217, 217-21 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 638 and establishing the SBIR pro-
gram). 
200.  See generally Small Business Research and Development Enhancement Act of 
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-564, 106 Stat. 4249, 4256-61 (establishing the STTR program).  
201.  See 15 U.S.C. § 638(a) (2012); see also About SBIR, supra note 194; What are 
SBIR and STTR Programs, supra note 198.   
202.  See What are SBIR and STTR Programs, supra note 198.   
203.  See § 638(a) (2012). 
204.  Id. 
205.  See id.; About SBIR, supra note 194; About STTR, supra note 194. 
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Under the SBIR/STTR programs, federal agencies must re-
serve a portion of their research and development awards for 
small business concerns through the SBIR/STTR programs.206  
Awards through the SBIR/STTR programs can be in the form of 
“any contract, grant, or cooperative agreement entered into be-
tween any Federal agency and any small business” for develop-
mental or research work funded at least in part by the federal gov-
ernment.207  Every federal agency with a research and 
development budget of greater than $100 million must participate 
in the SBIR program by setting aside a certain percentage of their 
research and development budget for small businesses.208  Prior 
to 2012, this percentage was 2.5%; however, it has increased by 
0.1% each year since and will continue to increase until reaching 
a base requirement of 3.2% in 2017.209  Additionally, every fed-
eral agency with research and development budgets greater than 
$1 billion must participate in the STTR program by reserving 
0.45% of their budget for small businesses that cooperate with 
universities, federally funded research and development centers, 
and other non-profit scientific and educational institutions.210 
To be eligible for an SBIR/STTR award, a firm or entrepre-
neur must meet several eligibility criteria.  A company must be 
for-profit and U.S. owned and operated with fewer than 500 em-
ployees.211  Notably, the average SBIR funding recipient has only 
206.  Id. at 638(f)(1).  
207.  Id. at 638(e)(3).  
208.  15 U.S.C. § 638(f)(1) (2012).  Currently, eleven federal agencies participate in 
the SBIR program: Department of Agriculture; Department of Commerce—Both the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration; Department of Defense; Department of Education; Department of Energy; De-
partment of Health and Human Services; Department of Homeland Security; Department of 
Transportation; Environmental Protection Agency; National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration; and National Science Foundation.  About SBIR, supra note 194. 
209.  See § 638(f)(1). 
210.  Id. at 638(n)(1)(A), (B).  Currently, five federal agencies participate in the STTR 
program: Department of Defense; Department of Energy; Department of Health and Human 
Services; National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and National Science Foundation. 
About STTR, supra note 194. 
211.  The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology 
Transfer (STTR) Program, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFFICE OF INV. & INNOVATION, 
https://healthsciences.ucsd.edu /vchs /research-services /funding-opportunities /Documents 
/SBIR%20Overview%20Slides_25Jan12.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2Q4-E6UJ].  
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nine employees.212  Furthermore, an SBIR/STTR firm is primar-
ily a research and development organization and focuses on re-
search and development and not on purchasing equipment or 
commercializing an existing technology.213  To obtain an STTR 
award, there is an additional requirement that the small business 
must collaborate with a research institution.214  The partnering re-
search institution must “be a nonprofit college, university, or re-
search organization, or a federally funded [research and develop-
ment] center” that is located in the U.S.215 
The SBIR/STTR program offers a milestone-driven funding 
process that is divided into three phases.216  Phase I awards are 
granted based on “the scientific and technical merit and feasibility 
of ideas that appear to have commercial potential . . . .”217  Phase 
II awards are granted to continue the research and development 
commenced in Phase I and are “based on the results achieved in 
Phase I and the scientific and technical merit and commercial po-
tential of the project proposed in Phase II.”218  Phase III’s objec-
tive is to pursue commercialization of the results obtained from 
Phase I and II.219  However, Phase III awards are distinct from 
Phase I and II in that no further government funding is provided, 
rather all commercial applications and development are to be 
funded through non-federal capital.220  Finally, an awardee’s fail-
ure to meet the minimum commercialization benchmarks bars 
that awardee for qualifying for awards for one year.221 
Obtaining an SBIR award has other ancillary advantages. 
An empirical study of the long-run effects of receiving such an 
award revealed that compared to similarly situated companies that 
did not receive such funds, winning an SBIR award positively in-
fluenced an awardee’s growth, particularly in locations in which 
212.  SBIR-STTR Program Presentation, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFFICE OF INV. & 
INNOVATION. [PowerPoint presentation].  
213.  Id. 
214.  Tina Reynolds, Why Congress Should Quickly Re-Up 2 Small Biz Programs, 
LAW360 (Aug. 31, 2016, 11:15 AM), https://www.law360.com/ articles/ 832912/ why- con-
gress- should- quickly-re-up -2-small-biz- programs [https://perma.cc/HSP5-G2D2]. 
215.  Id. 
216.  About SBIR, supra note 194; About STTR, supra note 194. 
217.  15 U.S.C. § 638(e)(4)(A) (2012). 
218.  Id. at 638(4)(B); About SBIR, supra note 194. 
219.  § 638(e)(4)(c)(i), (ii).  
220.  Id. 
221.  Id. at 638(qq)(1)(B).  
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there was access to venture-capital activity.222  Such data suggests 
the presence of a “certification effect,” where awardees can more 
easily obtain private capital after receiving an SBIR/STTR 
grant.223  However, SBIR/STIR are highly competitive programs. 
Because these grants are viewed as somewhat of an investment 
by the federal government, applicants are held to the highest of 
standards.  The proposal requirements and project-management 
criteria are rigorous and often overwhelming to a first-time appli-
cant.224 
While the federal agencies that oversee the SBIR/STIR 
awards provide information on how to apply for the grants, they 
do not provide technical assistance to the researchers on how to 
put a project team together or provide the necessary information 
to submit a winning proposal.  In addition to having an innovative 
idea worthy of funding to achieve commercialization, it is neces-
sary for the applicant to develop business plans, conduct market 
and competitive research, and demonstrate both technical and 
project management capabilities.  In some instances, this will re-
quire networking and bringing individuals or companies into the 
project management team to compliment the scientific and tech-
nical skills of the principal investigators.  In essence, there is a 
need to develop a capacity much like the venture capital model to 
assist in the SBIR/STIR innovation development process. 
B. State Small Business Credit Initiative 
The 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent recession were 
exceptionally hard on small businesses.  Between 2008 and 2010, 
222.  Josh Lerner, The Government as Venture Capitalist: The Long-Run Impact of the 
SBIR Program, 72 J. BUS. 285, 301-03 (1999) [hereinafter Long-Run].  Lerner compared the 
growth of Phase II awardees with matching firms that did not receive such funding.  The 
results revealed that the Phase II awardees experienced a mean employment increase of 32.6 
employees from 1985 to 1995 as compared to the matching firms’ mean employment in-
crease of 5 employees. Likewise, the Phase II awardees saw a $4 million sales increase com-
pared to only $1.1 million for the matching firms.  For the mean SBIR awardee, these statis-
tics represented a 56% increase in employment and a 98% boost in sales.  The differences 
were determined to be statistically significant by t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.  
223.  Camilla A. Hrdy, Commercialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 13, 63 (2015).  
Hrdy suggests that Lerner’s finding that SBIR awardees grew significantly faster than 
matched companies in areas with substantial venture capital activity is evidence that award-
ees could more easily acquire private investors due to their receipt of an SBIR award. 
224.  See Long-Run, supra note 222, at 294-96. 
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small business lending fell more than 8% after rising steadily for 
several years.225  “The recession also constrained [the] private eq-
uity” markets that supported high growth start-ups.226  During a 
period when small business needed access to capital the most to 
help the country recover from the recession, debt and equity fi-
nancing became scarce.227  In response, Congress, through the 
Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, allocated $1.5 billion as a 
“credit support program” to fund small businesses facing barriers 
to obtaining necessary financing.228  The Act created the State 
Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI) which permitted states 
to use federal funding to leverage private lending and equity, al-
lowing states to build upon successful state models for small busi-
ness development programs.229  A departure from federal credit 
programs with uniform requirements, states were given flexibility 
to design programs that address local market conditions.230  This 
has allowed states to build upon existing state programs as well 
as develop new state-run initiatives.231  SSBCI rules only require 
that states develop a plan to target underserved communities, 
small businesses, and leverage ten dollars of new small business 
lending or investing for every one dollar of public funds allocated 
during the life of the program.232 
225.  EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 9. 
Small business loans in this context are considered $1 million dollars or less.  Such loans fell 
from $712 billion to $652 billion from 2008 to 2010.   
226.  Id. 
227.  Id.; see also Karen Gordon Mills & Brayden McCarthy, The State of Small Busi-
ness Lending: Credit Access During the Recovery and How Technology May Change the 
Game, 15 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper 15-004, 2014). 
228.  GRAVES & KELLOGG, supra note 49.  While the SSBCI is one example, the De-
partment of Treasury “manages a large portfolio of programs and fiscal policies intended to 
strengthen the U.S. Economy . . . .”  CROMWELL & SCHMISSEUR , supra note 49, at 1.  
229.  CROMWELL & SCHMISSEUR, supra note 49, at 1. 
230.  See id. 
231.  INCITE CO-INVESTMENT FUND, supra note 50  (“Since its founding in 2011, 
INCITE has used $28.8 million in federal funding under the State Small Business Credit 
Initiative . . . .”).  But see  CROMWELL & SCHMISSEUR, supra note 49, at 1-2 (describing how 
30 states participate in SSBCI and that California and Massachusetts do not use SSBCI cap-
ital for state venture capital programs). 
232.  EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 10.  
“All states were eligible to participate and 47 states, the District of Columbia, five territories, 
and four municipalities or consortia of municipalities ultimately applied.  The municipal 
consortia came together to create initiatives when three states opted not to participate di-
rectly.”  Id. at 11.  “The consortia from North Dakota include 38 municipalities led by the 
City of Mandan and 36 municipalities led by the City of Carrington.  In Wyoming, 17 mu-
nicipalities led by the City of Laramie formed a consortium.”  Id. at 11 n.3.   
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Participating states administer the SSBCI funds through 
three primary management structures: state agencies,233 quasi-
public agencies,234 or contracted private entities.235  The organi-
zations that administer the funds within the state work with par-
ticipating lenders and investors to structure small business financ-
ing programs that address the investment gaps in a particular 
regional ecosystem.236  The initiative allowed states to employ al-
ternative program designs and offer different terms and condi-
tions to address different capital gaps and types of customers.  De-
spite these differences, the programs are classified into five 
design models or types.237  Four of the five design models are 
lending programs, with community banks, mid-sized banks, and 
community development financial institutions accounting for 
94% of all program supported loans.238  From 2011 to 2015, states 
233.  Id. at 12.  “[S]tate agencies most frequently administered programs when expand-
ing on existing credit support programs.”  Id. at 13.  
234.  Id.  “[Q]uasi-public agencies [are] legislatively created, independent organiza-
tions such as housing or business financing authorities or economic development corpora-
tions, [that are] well-situated to operate small business finance programs because they [have] 
existing relationships with private lenders and/or investors.”  Id. at 13.   
235.  Id.  “[S]tates contracted with a wide array of private entities including non-profit 
[Community Development Financial Institutions] CDFIs, for-profit business development 
corporations (BDCs), and SBA [Certified Development Companies] CDCs, among others. 
[Venture Capital Programs] contracted with private sector venture capital funds and special-
ized non-profits.”  Id. at 13.   
236.  Id. at 81. 
237.  EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 10-11.  
Capital access programs (CAPs) provide reserve funds to protect lenders from losses.  These 
programs provide working capital to micro-enterprises (less than 10 employees or $1 million 
in sales).  Loan guarantee programs (LGPs) provide repayment guarantee for a large portion 
of loan in the event of default, once the lender makes a reasonable attempt to liquidate avail-
able collateral and collect on personal guarantees.  LGPs are used for lines of credit, working 
capital, asset purchases, and commercial real estate for established businesses.  Collateral 
support programs (CSPs) provide cash to lenders to boost the value of available collateral in 
the event of default.  This program can be used for asset purchases, commercial real estate 
purchases, and gap financing for SBA 504 transactions.  Loan participation programs (LPPs) 
provide subordinated or pari passu debt to encourage senior lenders to increase loan size or 
reduce interest rate.  Venture capital programs (VCPs) provide risk capital to small busi-
nesses with high growth potential.  This program is focused on providing capital to seed and 
early stage, or growth capital to start-ups or emerging small businesses (businesses with new 
products or growing markets).  
238.  Id. at 13.  “Large national banks tended not to participate because of operational 
challenges of implementing multiple sets of compliance and reporting requirements, which 
varied from state to state.”  Id. 
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allocated 69% of the SSBCI funds to credit support programs.239  
While certain small innovative start-up businesses might qualify 
for SSBCI lending programs once they become growth or later 
stage enterprises that generate revenue, perhaps a more appropri-
ate source of funding would come through the fifth design model, 
venture capital programs. 
States that that had less access to venture capital tended to 
use SSBCI funds for venture capital programs.240  Thirty eight 
states implemented, modified, or expanded venture capital pro-
grams with $448 million or 31% of SSBCI funding from 2011 to 
2015.241  Although venture capital programs varied widely be-
tween states, they all tended to address the gaps in their existing 
venture capital availability.242  States also took different ap-
proaches to how they managed their venture capital programs, 
ranging from making direct investments in businesses to the tra-
ditional approach of investing in or through private investment 
funds.243 
While stages of small business development are not always 
easily defined, “[t]he venture capital industry commonly uses 
terms such as ‘seed,’ ‘early,’ ‘growth,’ and ‘latter,’ to describe the 
stages of small businesses receiving venture capital investments 
. . . .”244  Many inventors seek small amounts of money at the time 
of business formation to demonstrate the potential of the intellec-
tual property or prove technical concepts.245  Since the risk of fail-
ure is high at this pre-seed or proof of concept stage, SSBCI co-
investments of less than $50,000 are important in attracting pri-
vate capital for such purposes, either through angel investors or 
accelerator programs.246  At these early stages of investment, the 
239.  Id. at 31.  The $766 million in SSBCI funds triggered $5.3 billion in new small 
business loans.  Id. 
240.  See id. at 61. 
241.  Id. at 1, 59.  The $488 million in SSBCI funds “leveraged nearly $1.7 billion in 
co-investment and more than $3 billion inclusive of private financing . . . .” Id.  
242.  EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 12. 
“Reflecting the variety of equity capital needs, states created programs that targeted pre-seed 
and ‘proof of concept’ investments, seed stage and early stage investments, growth stage and 
later stage investments, as well as mezzanine and debt investments.”  Id.  
243.  See id. at 12, 65-71 (analyzing the states’ approaches).   
244.  Id. at 74 (citation omitted).   
245.  Id.   
246.  Id.  At this stage of development, “business value determination is sometimes 
deferred until a future ‘institutional’ investment round through the use of a convertible note 
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SSBCI venture capital program would contribute a much higher 
ratio of capital than would the private investor.247 
Most state venture capital programs focused investments on 
seed and early stage investments.248  Seed stage businesses typi-
cally have the “founding team working to develop product proto-
types or business model concepts . . . .”249  Early stage businesses 
are ventures with a proven concept or product ready for market 
introduction with a developed management team, but without 
positive cash flows from operations.250  In areas that have signif-
icant venture capital presence, investment rounds are typically in 
the $1 million to $5 million range.251  Because the great majority 
of investments in early stage businesses were outside these re-
gions, the SSBCI venture capital program investment was less 
than $1 million.  Angel investors were important co-investors in 
these early stage investments, with the SSBCI funds accounting 
for a higher percentage of each round, resulting in lower private 
capital investments, than in later rounds.252 
Growth stage businesses are those that have received previ-
ous rounds of investment and are generating significant revenues 
from operations.253  Additional capital is necessary for business 
expansion.254  While some states used SSBCI financing to invest 
in businesses that they had invested in during seed and early stage 
financing rounds, private capital is more willing to invest in 
structure, in which the loan value can be converted to equity with the same terms as the other 
investors.”  Id. at 74-75. 
247.  EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 75. 
See also, Gabriel Horowitz, Does VC Mean Venture Capital or Very Concentrated?, FORBES 
(Feb. 16, 2017, 5:55 AM), http:// www. forbes.com /sites /washingtonbytes /2017 /02/16 
/does -vc -mean -venture -capital -or-very-concentrated/2/#18995bf25e8c[https://perma.cc/ 
3FZP-ZSYL].  
248.  EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 76. 
About two-thirds of the program-wide transactions supported pre-seed and seed investments. 
Id. at 4.  
249.  Id. at 75.   
250.  Id.   
251.  Id. 
252.  Id.  “[C]onvertible notes structure is also used in early stage investments, but 
transactions were more likely to be structured as priced equity rounds, typically as preferred 
stock rather than the common stock held by founders and employees of the small businesses.” 
Id.  The business is valued based upon the amount of capital invested and related percentage 
of ownership purchased by the investors.  Id. 
253.  EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 75. 
254.  See id.  
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greater percentages in this phase due to decreased risk of fail-
ure.255  Although growth stage investment rounds of $5 million 
or more are common in areas of high venture capital concentra-
tion, SSBCI venture capital program investments in this phase 
outside such areas were in the million-dollar range.256 
Those states that have SSBCI programs that provide financ-
ing to “later stage” businesses did so with both debt and equity.257  
These maturing small businesses usually have sufficient cash 
flows to service debt, but have other risk factors that disqualify 
them from obtaining a traditional bank loan.258  The additional 
financing may be necessary for such reasons as gaining market 
share, diversifying product lines or preparing for a liquidity 
event.259  The typical state SSBCI investment in latter stage eq-
uity investment or debt/mezzanine investment was greater than 
$5 million.260  States that focused their venture capital programs 
on this business phase appeared to place greater emphasis on 
near-term job creation than in attracting outside or growing inter-
nal private capital investments in seed and early stage small busi-
ness.261 
Once the states had developed their structure for delivering 
the SSBCI programs, funding was allocated to the states by for-
mula and distributed in one-third increments.262  “As of March 
31, 2016, Treasury had disbursed $1.38 billion, or about 95%, of 
the $1.45 billion available to states” or “[] $1.5 billion minus 
Treasury’s administrative costs[].”263  In most instances, the ini-
tial tranche of funding took place in fiscal year 2011.264  Most 
states received their second tranche during fiscal year 2013.265 
255.  Id. 
256.  Id.  “The terms of growth stage investments typically provide investors with pre-
ferred stock at specified valuations.”  Id.   
257.  Id. at 76.   
258.  EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 76. 
259.  Id. 
260.  Id.  State venture capital programs typically structured later stage equity invest-
ments as preferred stock at specified valuations.  Id.  “Debt/mezzanine investments were 
typically structured as loans with stock warrants or royalties based on revenues.”  Id.  
261.  Id. 
262.  SENIOR SPECIALIST IN AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42581, STATE SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE: IMPLEMENTATION AND 
FUNDING ISSUES Summary (2016) [hereinafter SENIOR SPECIALIST].   
263.  Id. at 2.   
264.  Id. at 1.   
265.  Id. at summary. 
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“As of March 31, 2016, 95% of total allocated funding had been 
disbursed to the states and all 57 participants had received their 
first tranche, 55 had received at least two tranches, and 47 had 
received their third and final tranche.”266 
At this point, it is difficult to determine the impact that such 
funding has had on enhancing small business financing at the state 
and local level.267  The flexibility that the Treasury gave to the 
states to determine the appropriate program design to address lo-
cal market conditions may not have sufficient programmatic uni-
formity to make the programs easily accessible to small busi-
nesses seeking funding.  Unless a small business had been 
working with a state program that received SSBCI funding, infor-
mation about the program and how to access funds are not readily 
available or easily accessible.  Those states that instituted new 
funding programs had the additional burden of creating a program 
design and then obtaining the necessary staffing to plan and im-
plement the program.  If the initiative is to achieve a level of suc-
cess, start-ups and small businesses need assistance on how to 
gain access to such funding. 
C. The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act 
“Securities laws require that all offers and sales of securities 
be either registered with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) under the Securities Act of 1933 or made in reliance 
upon an exemption from registration.”268  The purpose of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 is to ensure that investors in securities receive 
complete and accurate information from the issuer prior to invest-
ing.269  “When raising capital through the sale of securities to any 
potential investors in the public capital market (a ‘public’ offer-
ing), the issuer must generally register the offer and sale of secu-
rities with the SEC, a process that is accompanied by extensive 
266.  Id. 
267.  SENIOR SPECIALIST, supra note 262, at 2-3.   
268.  Scott Bauguess, et al., Capital Raising in the U.S.: An Analysis of the Market for 
Unregistered Securities Offerings, 2009-2014, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION 3 (Oct. 2015), https://www.sec.gov/files/unregistered-offering10-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8XEU-BYTN].  
269.  See Small Business and the SEC, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, https:// www.sec.gov /info /smallbus /qasbsec. htm#fsl 
[https://perma.cc/BQ3A-7GDP]. 
2017 FOSTERING INNOVATION 593 
information production and subsequent reporting.”270  While 
these laws helped reduce fraud at the time, they also had the un-
intended consequences of restricting small business owners and 
entrepreneurs in their efforts to attract potential investors for crit-
ical early stage or growth capital.271 
“Alternatively, a company can raise capital by accessing the 
private capital markets through an unregistered (‘private’) offer-
ing in a transaction exempt from registration.”272  This alternative 
“allows issuers to avoid certain regulatory burdens and the in-
creased oversight that comes with a public offering, with the in-
tended effect of reducing issuance costs and the time required to 
raise new capital.”273  “This particularly benefits smaller firms, 
for whom accessing public capital markets may generally be too 
costly.”274  “However, because of these accommodations, private 
offering alternatives are generally subject to investor restrictions 
and/or offering limits.”275  “These investor protection provisions 
must be met to qualify for an exemption from registration.”276 
In 2012, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Act (JOBS Act), which amended the Securities Act of 
1933 to expand the number of investors that companies can solicit 
and also the amount of money that may be raised privately.277  Ti-
tle II (Access to Capital for Job Creators) Title III (Crowdfund-
ing),278 and Title IV (Small Company Capital Formation) focus 
on helping start-ups and small businesses obtain the private equity 
they need to develop and grow.279  Crowdfunding allows a com-
pany to raise up to $1 million dollars in the private equity market 
in a twelve-month period, which may meet the needs of seed and 
270.  Scott Bauguess, et al., supra note 268.  
271.  Chance Barnett, The Crowdfunder’s Guide to General Solicitation and Title II of 
the JOBS Act, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2013, 10:40 AM), https:// www.forbes.com/ sites/ chance-
barnett/ 2013/ 09/ 23 /the-crowdfunders-guide-to-general-solicitation-title-ii-of-the-jobs-
act/#6256c6666022 [https://perma.cc/2JNR-DNKD]. 
272.  Scott Bauguess, et al., supra note 268.  
273.  Id.  
274.  Id. 
275.  Id. 
276.  Id. 
277.  See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 101, 126 Stat. 
307 (2012).  
278.  CROWDFUND stands for “Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and 
Unethical Non-Disclosure Act . . . .”  Id. at §§ 201, 301.   
279.  See generally id. at §§ 101-08, 201, 301-12. 
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early stage companies.280  Both Title II and IV provide an oppor-
tunity for growth or later stage enterprises to access the private 
capital market for even greater levels of equity funding.281 
It took more than a year for the SEC to promulgate rules and 
implement Title II of the JOBS Act.282  Prior to this time, it was 
illegal to advertise and generally solicit private placement securi-
ties offerings.283  Companies can now undertake wider marketing 
efforts to obtain unregistered private equity funding; however, 
they must first take steps to verify that the purchasers are accred-
ited investors.284  Now that the general solicitation ban has been 
lifted, start-ups and small businesses can seek an unlimited 
amount of capital and leverage the internet for marketing their 
fundraising and access investment platforms to attract potential 
investors.285 
Title II requires relatively streamlined reporting require-
ments, filing a Form D with the SEC before solicitation and dis-
closing details of the general solicitation to them within fifteen 
280.  Id. at § 302(a)(6)(A). 
281.  Title III Equity Crowdfunding on SeedInvest, SEEDINVEST, https://www.seedin-
vest.com/blog/raising-capital/title-iii-equity-crowdfunding [https://perma.cc/8JSH-KZNF].  
282.  Barnett, supra note 271.   
283.  Id.  
284.  § 201.  Individuals are accredited investors if their net worth (including spouse 
net worth) is more than $1 million notwithstanding the value of their primary residence or 
they meet three income requirements: (1) individual income of $200,000 annually for the 
two most recent years, (2) annual family income greater than $300,000 for the last two years, 
and (3) has a “reasonable expectation” of maintaining those income levels in the present 
year.  17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(2017).  The Code of Federal Regulations also has qualifying 
levels for banks, savings and loan associations, broker, dealers, insurance companies, invest-
ment companies, business development companies, trusts, and other entities.  Id. at (a)(1).  
An investment company is an issuer of securities whose primary business dealings involve 
investing, reinvesting, or trading securities, engages in “the business of issuing face-amount 
certificates of the installment type,” or has assets comprised of greater than 40% of its total 
assets.  Investment Company Act of 1940, PUB. L. 112-90 § 3(a)(1) (2012).  A business 
development company is defined as a publicly traded business entity who is functionally an 
investment company that also “makes available significant managerial assistance” to com-
panies if they comprise 70% of its total assets and makes an election under section 55 of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940.  Id. at § 2(48)(B).  Business development companies came 
about in 1980 by amendment to the Investment Company Act.  Kevin Mahn, The ABCs of 
Business Development Companies, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2014, 10:18 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/advisor/2014/12/01/the-abcs-of-business-development-com-
panies/#7c51fd2369db [https://perma.cc/B6DL-N2BZ]. 
285.  See Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Approves 
JOBS Act Requirement to Lift General Solicitation Ban (July 10, 2013)  (on file at website), 
https://www.sec.gov /News /PressRelease /Detail /PressRelease /1370539707782 
[https://perma.cc/3XHQ-P4HA].  
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days from such solicitation.286  Strict verification is required to 
confirm that investors are accredited.  The penalty for not follow-
ing the general solicitation requirements with the SEC is being 
banned from fundraising for a full year,287 a penalty that would 
prove disastrous to a start-up seeking necessary funding.  How-
ever, since only about 3% the United States’ 8 million accredited 
investors are investing in this space, there is a large opportunity 
for growth.288 
Title III amends Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act of 
1933289 and allows companies to sell a small amount of stock to 
a large number of people via web sites called funding portals.290 
Additionally, it exempts securities sold pursuant to Section 
4(a)(6) from the registration requirements of Section 12(g) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.291  The SEC adopted final rules 
for equity crowdfunding that became effective on May 16, 
2016.292  Unlike Title II, the sale of securities to individuals do 
not have to be accredited investors.293  It allows a company to 
raise $1 million in a twelve month period, sets limits on how much 
an unaccredited investor can invest,294 and requires the transac-
tion to be conducted through a broker or “funding portal that com-
plies” with 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1.295  A “funding portal” is a financial 
286.  § 201(a)(1); § 230.503(a)(1); see also Small Business and the SEC, supra note 
269.  
287.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a)(39)(B)(II). 
288.  Mike Norman, Why General Solicitation Matters: The JOBS Act Eliminates the 
Ban on Advertising, WEFUNDER (Nov. 27, 2012), https://wefunder.com/post/33-why-gen-
eral-solicitation-matters [https://perma.cc/6XAH-Q5YB].  
289.  See § 302(a)(6); § 77(d)(a)(6).   
290. Funding Portals: Investor Education, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/indus-
try/funding-portals [https://perma.cc/A5W3-PQGC]. 
291.  §§ 77d(a)(6)(c)-(d), 77d-1(a). 
292. Crowdfunding, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9974.pdf [https://perma.cc/FGS3-HAWB].  
293.  § 303(a)(6); Chance Barnett, SEC Approves Title III of JOBS Act, Equity Crowd-




294.  The language from the JOBS Act lays out several investor income requirements. 
See §§ 302(a)(6)(A), (B).  
295.  Id. at § 302(a)(6)(C). 
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intermediary that can sell stock online to non-accredited inves-
tors.296 
One of the objectives of the JOBS Act was to encourage 
small business and startup funding by easing federal regulations 
and allowing average individuals to become investors.297  How-
ever, in order to protect the unsophisticated investor and prevent 
fraud, there are still a significant number of regulations and dis-
closure requirements with which the issuing company and finan-
cial intermediary must comply.298  Any financial intermediary en-
gaging in crowdfunding must register with the SEC and the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).299  The fund-
ing portal may not advertise for securities on its website, pay an-
yone to solicit investors, manage customer funds or securities, or 
offer investment advice or recommendations.300 
The issuing company must register with the SEC and pro-
vide comprehensive company information to both the intermedi-
ary facilitating the offerings and the potential investors.301  The 
Crowdfunding rules require investors have access to business 
plans, financial statements, the price of the security and how it 
296.  § 78c(a)(80).  See Joan Macleod Heminway, The New Intermediary on the Block: 
Funding Portals Under the CROWDFUND Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 177, 190-91 (2013) 
(citation omitted).  
297.  Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts Rules to 
Permit Crowdfunding (Oct. 30, 2015) (on file at website), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html [https://perma.cc/LZ3J-9AL5].  
298.  See generally The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https:// www.sec.gov /about /laws.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/YYQ5-5RJN] (noting several regulations); see also PROTECTING 
INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION, U.S. SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION xvii (May 1992), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/invest-
ment/guidance/icreg50-92.pdf [https://perma.cc/C54G-6RZJ].  
299.  Updated: Crowdfunding and the JOBS Act: What Investors Should Know, 
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/crowdfunding-and-jobs-act-what-investors-
should-know [https://perma.cc/M9ED-XVZ2].  
300.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78c (80)(a)(A)-(E); Updated: Crowdfunding and the JOBS Act: 
What Investors Should Know, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ investors/ alerts/ crowdfunding- 
and- jobs- act- what- investors- should- know [https://perma.cc/M9ED-XV2]; Regulation 
Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Crowdfunding Intermediaries, U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.Zsec.gov /divisions /marketreg 
/tmcompliance /cfintermediaryguide.htm#_ftn4 [https://perma.cc/PM44-7ZJF].  
301.  Sherwood Neiss, It Might Cost You $39k to Crowdfund $100k Under the SEC’s 
New Rules, VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 2, 2014, 2:14 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2014/01/02/it-
might-cost-you-39k-to-crowdfund-100k-under-the-secs-new-rules/ [https://perma.cc/2ZX8-
45M7] (explaining a recent SEC cost–benefit report that looked at success fees, compliance 
costs, and costs of CPA review or audit). 
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was determined, and how the proceeds from the sale will be 
used.302  The price of professional services to complete the re-
quired documents and assist in compliance, can be costly.  The 
SEC estimates that raising $100,000 may cost up to $39,810303 
and as much as $151,660 for a $1 million dollar raise.304  If, dur-
ing the course of advertising, an issuer305 “makes an[y] untrue 
statement of material fact or omits to state a material fact” that 
makes any “means or instruments of transportation or communi-
cation” misleading, the JOBS Act specifically creates liability for 
the investor against the issuer.306 
In June 2015, the SEC issued final rules under Title IV that 
amended Regulation A of the Securities Act to apply to public 
offerings of securities that do not exceed $50 million dollars in a 
one-year period.307  Commonly referred to as Regulation A+, Ti-
tle IV allows non-accredited investors to participate in private of-
ferings, subject to certain provisions.308  The rule establishes two 
tiers under Regulation A.309 
Tier 1, which covers exempt public offerings of up to $20 
million within a twelve-month period, retains many of the previ-
ous requirements of Regulation A.310  Tier 2 allows exempt public 
offerings of up to $50 million within twelve months but requires 
302.  Id. 
303.  Id.  For raises of less than $100,000 cost estimates range from $12,960 - $17,960.  
For raises between $100,000 and $500,000 cost estimates range from $39,810 - $69,810.  Id. 
304.  Id.  For raises between $500,000 and $1 million cost estimates range from 
$76,660 – $151,660.  Id. 
305.  In this context, issuer includes a director or partner of the issuer, the CEO, CFO, 
and “principal accounting officer” or controller of the issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(3) (2012). 
306. Id. at 77d-1(c)(2).  The communication must also use means of or travel in inter-
state commerce.  Id.  Also, it is a defense if the purchaser knew of the “untruth or omission.”  
Id.  
307.  See Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts Rules 
to Facilitate Smaller Companies’ Access to Capital, (Mar. 25, 2015) (on file at website), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-49.html  [ https://perma.cc/2VG4-JPQP].    
308.  Id. 
309.  Id. 
310.  Id.  See generally Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions under 
the Securities Act, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 7-9, 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9741.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN9Q-9JTM] (con-
taining citations to codified sections of Regulation A).  Companies utilizing the Regulation 
A exemption are still required to file offering statements with the SEC; however, the com-
panies utilizing the exemption are given distinct advantages over companies that must fully 
register.  Id.  The issuer of a Regulation A offering must give buyers documentation with the 
issue, similar to the prospectus of a registered offering.  Id. 
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more robust initial and ongoing reporting.311  Tier 2 offerings are 
intended to preempt state securities laws known as Blue Sky 
laws.312  Tier 1 offerings will continue to be subject to state secu-
rities law registration and qualification requirements.313  How-
ever, Tier 1 issuers may be able to benefit from the multistate re-
view protocol for Regulation A filings that was implemented by 
the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. 
(NASAA).314 
The above three titles of the JOBS Act all promise to in-
crease the amount of private equity available to entrepreneurs in 
need of capital.  While it is impossible to predict how much addi-
tional capital will be brought to market through these new funding 
mechanisms, it is estimated that $1 billion was invested online 
under Title II in 2014 and $2.5 billion in 2015.315  There is also 
an estimated 8 million accredited investors in the United States, 
and only 3% of them have ever invested in a start-up.316  There is 
approximately $26 trillion in savings and long-term investments 
311.  SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller Companies’ Access to Capital, supra 
note 307.   
312.  Id.  Companies rarely used the previous Regulation A exemption for public of-
ferings.  The JOBS Act required the Comptroller General of the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to study the effect of state securities laws on Regulation A offerings.  In its 
report to Congress, the GAO discussed factors that contributed to the limited use of Regula-
tion A, including the small size of the offerings, the significant time and cost of complying 
with both federal and state securities laws and the availability of other offering exemptions.  
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions under the Securities Act, supra 
note 310, at 31.   
313.  SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller Companies’ Access to Capital, supra 
note 307.   
314.  See Coordinated Review, NASAA, http://www.nasaa.org/industry-re-
sources/corporation-finance/coordinated-review/ [https://perma.cc/P5FQ-DUFN].  
315.  Chance Barnett, Trends Show Crowdfunding To Surpass VC in 2016, FORBES 
(June 9, 2015, 5:33 PM) [hereinafter Trends Show], http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebar-
nett/2015/06/09/trends-show-crowdfunding-to-surpass-vc-in-2016/#56dfe399444b 
[https://perma.cc/C47B-QEBR].  Since this is “private equity,” accurate statistics are diffi-
cult to collect.   
316.  Chance Barnett, SEC Democratizes Equity Crowdfunding With JOBS Act Title 
IV, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2015, 8:41 PM) [hereinafter  SEC Democratizes], 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2015/03/26/infographic-sec-democratizes-eq-
uity-crowdfunding-with-jobs-act-title-iv/#1585185f5a71  [https://perma.cc/Z2K9-4J4P].  
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in the United States. If only 1% of that amount was shifted to pri-
vate equity through these exemptions, an additional $260 billion 
could be used to support small and start-up businesses.317 
Critics argue that potential investors will be misled by a 
company’s prospects and fraud will run rampant.318  Federal and 
state securities regulators agree that investments such as these are 
particularly prone to affinity frauds.319  Crowdfunding could 
make it easier for people to solicit money from their own social 
networks using online services.  However, the SEC rulemaking 
process structured the investment limits for non-accredited inves-
tors to protect them from losing their life savings.320  Both FINRA 
and the funding portals provide some safe guards to the process, 
but ultimately it is the issuing company that is responsible for the 
accuracy of the information provided.321 
Investing in start-up companies is also very risky. About 
three quarters of venture backed companies don’t return the initial 
investment; venture capitalists and angel investors know this and 
invest in many companies hoping a few succeed.322  In addition, 
these professional investors also provide strategic and manage-
ment assistance to such ventures to increase the probability of 
success.  Even entrepreneurs with promising, commercially via-
ble products or services are simply ill-equipped to pursue such 
funding opportunities on their own. 
V.  FROM FEDERAL POLICY TO EFFECTIVE 
PROGRAM DELIVERY 
The federal programs described above are designed to help 
small businesses and start-ups get the capital necessary to grow 
317.  See AMY CORTESE, LOCAVESTING: THE REVOLUTION IN LOCAL INVESTING AND 
HOW TO PROFIT FROM IT 16 (2011) (citation omitted) (noting that more money needs to go 
into local businesses).    
318.  See Timothy Spangler, Is Crowdfunding Good for Investors?, THE NEW YORKER 
(Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/is-crowdfunding-good-for-
investors [https://perma.cc/E5GK-ZG5K].  
319.  Id. 
320.  See Josh Cline, The Six Things Non-Accredited Investors Need to Know About 
Title III of the JOBS Act, HUFFINGTON POST (May 24, 2017), https://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/josh-cline/the-six-things-nonaccredi_b_10104512.html 
[https://perma.cc/R5B3-KABB].  
321.  Id.  
322.  Spangler, supra note 318. 
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and contribute to the economy.  These programs have the capa-
bility to fill the gaps outside of California, Massachusetts, and 
New York that do not have a significant venture or angel capital 
presence.323  This is especially true in areas that have national la-
boratory and university research presence, but can prove equally 
important in underserved urban and rural areas that seek to foster 
economic development through entrepreneurship. 
However, the realization of this potential is heavily depend-
ent on how well-prepared the entrepreneur is to successfully ac-
cess those sources of capital and determine which option is best 
given the nature of their enterprise, stage of development, and the 
founders’ vision for the future.  Absent the active guidance his-
torically provided by venture capitalists and angels, the novice 
entrepreneur must rely on the local resources available to them to 
navigate the various potential funding options. Fledgling entre-
preneurs look to Small Business Development Centers 
(SBDCs),324 business incubators,325 or merely resort to the Inter-
net for such information.326  SBDCs provide the entrepreneur 
with fundamental management advice and training necessary to 
embark on a venture and incubators provide an environment to 
nurture the start-up.327  While not all business incubators are 
alike, most offer the entrepreneur office space, administrative 
support, and the ability to work alongside other entrepreneurs 
323.  Companies in California, New York, and Massachusetts were the beneficiaries 
of 78% of all venture capital investments.  2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 14.  Although 
more widespread regionally, companies in California, New York and New England attract 
41.8% of angel investments.  See 2015 Annual Halo Report, supra note 191, at 12-19.   
324.  Small Business Development Centers were created by the Small Business Devel-
opment Act of 1980, and provide management and technical support to an estimated 1 mil-
lion people annually through nearly 1,000 centers nationally. Our History, AMERICA’S 
SBDC, http://americassbdc.org/about-us/history/ [https://perma.cc/R27T-87R7]. 
325.  A business incubator is “[a]n organization designed to accelerate the growth and 
success of entrepreneurial companies through an array of business support resources and 
services that could include physical space, capital, coaching, common services, and network-
ing connections.”  Entrepreneur Staff, Business Incubator, ENTREPRENEUR, https://www.en-
trepreneur.com/encyclopedia/business-incubator [https://perma.cc/H7S9-6QUJ].  
326.  Darren Dahl, Percolating Profits: A New Generation of “Virtual” Business Incuba-
tors is Jump-Starting Start-Ups Nationwide, INC. (Feb. 1, 2005), http://www.inc.com/maga-
zine/20050201/getting-started.html [https://perma.cc/JF62-CFPH] (discussing the use of virtual 
business incubators to allow entrepreneurs to garner the advice of the business incubator without 
actually being located at the incubator site).  
327.  About Office of Small Business Development Centers, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 
https://www.sba.gov/offices/headquarters/osbdc/about-us [https://perma.cc/8TH4-N3AD].  
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who are pursuing their own ventures.328  Many incubators also 
offer connections to legal and accounting professionals, as well 
as exposure to potential financing opportunities.329  These organ-
izations are primarily concentrated near universities or in major 
metropolitan areas.330  When associated with universities, busi-
ness incubators may also provide services related to intellectual 
property and assist in transferring knowledge from university re-
searchers to firms that are commercializing intellectual prop-
erty.331  Although these support organizations certainly provide 
useful information and support services to the entrepreneur, un-
like the angel investor or venture capitalist, they do not take a 
personal stake in the venture and provide ongoing guidance 
throughout the life of the venture. 
Business accelerators are the most recent organizational en-
trant on the scene.332  Accelerators share many of the same attrib-
utes as incubators, but have two major differences.  Accelerators 
generally make investments in the companies enrolled in their 
programs and limit the amount of time that the company stays 
with the accelerator to three to four months.333  The amount of 
money invested varies based upon the amount of equity the accel-
erators receive in return. Estimates range from $15,000 to 
$40,000 for between 5-8% of equity in the company, with the me-
dian investment of 5% for $20,000.334  Participation in accelerator 
328.  David Mielach, Business Incubators & Accelerators: Here’s the Big Difference, 
BUS. NEWS DAILY (June 19, 2013, 10:22 AM), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/ 
4658- business-incubator-accelerator difference.html [https://perma.cc/4BSC-KP88].  
329.  Sean M. Hackett and D. M. Dilts, A Systematic Review of Business Incubation 
Research, 1 J. TECH. TRANSFER 29, 64 (2004) (citation omitted).   
330.  See 900 Service Sites to Serve Your Local Business Needs, U.S. SMALL BUS. 
ADMIN., https:// www.sba.gov /offices /headquarters /osbdc /resources /11409 
[https://perma.cc/Z4CV-AXNR].  The SBDC National Information Clearinghouse serves the 
Small Business Development Center Network and America’s small business community.  
331.  See Frank T. Rothaermel & Marie Thursby, Incubator Firm Failure or Gradua-
tion?: The Role of University Linkages, 34 RESEARCH POLICY 1076, 1077-78 (2005). 
332.  See Kourosh Malek, et al., A Typology of Clean Technology Commercialization 
Accelerators, 32 J. ENGINEERING & TECH. MGMT. 26, 27-28, 32 (2014).  The first seed ac-
celerator was Y Combinator, which started in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 2005 and was 
later moved to Silicon Valley by Paul Graham.  Paul Graham, How Y Combinator Started, 
Y COMBINATOR (Mar. 15, 2012), http:// old.ycombinator.com /start.html 
[https://perma.cc/DW4N-EQ47].  
333.  Mielach, supra note 328. 
334.  Paula Andruss, What to Look for in an Accelerator Program, ENTREPRENEUR 
(Jan. 30, 2013), https:// www.entrepreneur.com /article /225242 [https://perma.cc/Z357-
ETR8].  
602 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  70:3 
programs is very competitive.  The top tier programs only accept 
about 1% of applications.335  The limited duration of the program 
forces the founders to focus exclusively on their business devel-
opment, sometimes working seven days a week to prepare for 
graduation, which is ultimately a pitch day to future investors.336  
Although a connection remains between the start-up and the ac-
celerator program through equity ownership, further mentoring 
and business development is dependent on the angel investors or 
venture capitalist that provide follow on funding. 
SBDCs, business incubators, and accelerators are all capable 
of delivering information concerning federal policy initiatives de-
signed to improve access to capital for entrepreneurs. However, 
they may not be the most effective mechanisms to integrate these 
policies into the innovative-finance ecosystem.  Not all small 
businesses are alike.337  The vast majority of small businesses are 
sole proprietorships that cover a wide range of sectors and do not 
have employees.338 Research suggests that while this small busi-
ness segment continues to grow and achieve record profits with 
advancements in technology, it does not create jobs.339  The next 
largest segment are small retailers that provide goods and services 
to consumers and other local businesses.340  Such businesses gen-
erally exist to support a family and employ a significant portion 
of the local workforce.341  The next largest segment are those 
businesses that support commercial and government supply 
chains.342  These businesses are typically growth oriented and op-
erate with a higher degree of management sophistication.343  The 
335.  Id. 
336.  Susan Cohen, What Do Accelerators Do? Insights from Incubators and Angels, 
8 INNOVATIONS 19, 21 (2013). 
337.  The Small Business Administration establishes small business size standards on 
an industry-by-industry basis, but generally specifies small businesses as having fewer than 
five hundred employees for manufacturing businesses and less than $7.5 million in annual 
receipts for most non-manufacturing businesses. Summary of Size Standards by Industry Sec-
tor, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.sba.gov/contracting/getting-
started-contractor/make-sure-you-meet-sba-size-standards/summary-size-standards-indus-
try-sector [https://perma.cc/Z5NL-QHFR].  
338.  Mills, supra note 118.  23 million firms are sole proprietorships.  Id.  
339.  Id. 
340.  Id.  There are approximately four million small “Main Street” entrepreneurs, 
which include such businesses as dry cleaners, restaurants, car repair operations, etc.  Id. 
341.  Id.  There are approximately 1 million suppliers to other businesses. Id. 
342.  Id.  
343.  Mills, supra note 118.   
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smallest segment of this group is fast growing start-ups.344  These 
companies have a disproportionate effect on the economy and are 
responsible for as much as 50% of new job creation.345  Each type 
of small business is important to the economy for different rea-
sons, but their need for funding and technical assistance are sig-
nificantly different. 
For those innovation driven start-ups, the future of available 
funding has never looked more promising.  The SBIR/STIR pro-
grams have the potential of providing small businesses attempting 
to commercialize federal research and development with the seed 
capital necessary to reach the proof of concept stage of develop-
ment.  The SSBCI program provides states with the funding nec-
essary to leverage private investments, and the flexibility to pro-
vide access to funding to the full range of small business 
segments.  The JOBS Act makes it easier for small businesses to 
solicit funding from investors across the country, as long as they 
comply with the provisions of the Act.  However, the question 
remains: Is there an effective program-delivery mechanism in 
place to provide comprehensive guidance to entrepreneurs on 
how to access and coordinate such funding opportunities, based 
upon their particular business segment? 
Innovation focused small businesses can apply to business 
incubators and accelerators for office support, guidance and ex-
posure to funding opportunities, but only for a limited duration. 
Incubation is a process, not a place.  Venture Capitalists work 
with the portfolio companies for as much as ten years or more 
before they are monetized.346  An innovative technology or busi-
ness idea does not ensure a successful business.  Nor are entre-
preneurs born with all the requisite skills to be successful.  Intro-
ducing new funding opportunities to first time entrepreneurs 
without ongoing dedicated business guidance and acumen could 
be a recipe for disaster. 
After evaluating the strengths and limitations of the venture 
capital model, and particularly the operational philosophy of 
344.  Id.  There are approximately 200,000 fast growing – innovation driven firms. 
345.  Emily Fetsch, The Economic Impact of High-Growth Startups, KAUFFMAN 
FOUND. (June 7, 2016), http://www.kauffman.org /~ /media /kauffman_org /resources /2016 
/entrepreneurship%20policy%20digest/pd_highgrowth060716.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PGQ-
RVV8]. 
346.  2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 6.  
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Georges Doriot,347 it appears that a “Venture Development Com-
pany” (VDC) may be the next step in the evolution of innovation 
finance.  VDCs could provide an effective, local mechanism to 
work with innovative small businesses to access these new federal 
funding opportunities.  They have the potential of filling the gaps 
that exist nationally in the provision of venture capital financial 
resources and guidance.  Additionally, they can provide a mech-
anism to promote regional and economic development, since 
start-ups will no longer need to relocate to Silicon Valley or other 
areas of venture-capital density to receive funding. 
VDCs would be comprised of individuals from various pro-
fessional backgrounds and experiences—the type of people that 
historically became angel investors and formed early venture cap-
ital firms.348  In order to avoid the potential operational conflicts 
of interest that exist in the venture capital model, members of 
VDCs would not be suppliers of capital, but advisors and manag-
ers that would guide the company through the growth process in 
exchange for negotiated fees and equity positions in the company.  
In contrast to venture capital contracts, which are typically nonne-
gotiable and drafted to maximize control of the company by the 
venture capitalist, VDC agreements can offer more equitable 
terms.  Because the VDC is not trying to protect the members’ 
personal financial investment, only the company’s potential in-
vestment opportunity, there is no need for such one-sided contract 
provisions.  Because the VDC will be an equity holder in the busi-
ness, its interests will be aligned with those of the founders.  The 
venture development relationship proves to be most successful 
when all of the parties’ interests are aligned.349 
VDCs will identify promising start-ups through their partic-
ipation in incubator and accelerator programs or through other 
business networks.  Many entrepreneurs adopt an informal board 
347.  See generally Christina Pazzanese, The Talented Georges Doriot, HARVARD 
GAZETTE (Feb. 24, 2015) http://news.harvard.edu/ gazette/ story/2015/02/ the-talented-
georges-doriot/ [https://perma.cc/CFR8-ATAC]; Tren Griffen, A Dozen Things I’ve Learned 
from Georges Doriot (The Founder of the Modern VC Industry), 25IQ (June 4, 
2016),https://25iq.com/2016/06/04/a-dozen-things-ive-learned-from-georges-doriot-the-
founder-of-the-modern-vc-industry/ [https://perma.cc/2L42-ETF9]; Beattie, supra note 61.  
348.  VDCs would be formed by former entrepreneurs, executives, accountants, attor-
neys, and finance professionals that want to keep abreast of current developments in a par-
ticular business arena, mentoring another generation of entrepreneurs, and making use of 
their experience and networks. 
349.  2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 7-8. 
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of advisors during these programs to assist them in their develop-
ment, so the concept of entering into an agreement with a VDC 
for long-term advisory and management assistance will not be a 
foreign concept.  The support and technical assistance that the 
venture has relied upon during these early experiences will be in 
even greater demand as the venture progresses.  Like the original 
venture capital firms, VDCs will provide both strategic and oper-
ational guidance.  This will prove especially important as funding 
opportunities expand through the liberalization of securities laws 
through the JOBS Act.350  Entrepreneurs will need guidance and 
operational assistance on funding opportunities to achieve opti-
mal strategic results.351 
For example, many young entrepreneurs are intrigued with 
the idea of crowdfunding and feel that it presents the best oppor-
tunity for their venture to obtain the necessary funding.352  How-
ever, they may only have a casual understanding of what crowd-
funding is, and certainly less of an understanding of the options 
available to raise private equity through Titles II, III, and IV of 
the JOBS Act.353  Although the potential exists for this source of 
350.  Trends Show, supra note 315; Zack Miller, Crowdbuilding: The Real Story Be-
hind Crowdfunding That No One’s Telling, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2014, 7:45 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/zackmiller/2014/01/13/crowdbuilding-the-real-story-behind-
crowdfunding-that-no-ones-telling/print/ [https://perma.cc/V8ZL-2WWV].  
351.  With funding opportunities ranging from SBIR/STIR, SSBCI, JOBS Act, angel 
investors and venture capital, entrepreneurs will need to critically evaluate which source of 
funding to pursue as it may have consequences on the options available for subsequent 
rounds of financing.  In addition, accessing these sources of financing in some instances 
require extensive preparation of supporting materials to substantiate and justify obtaining 
such funding.   
352.  See Bill Carmody, Top 10 Reasons You MUST Crowdfund in 2017, INC., 
https://www.inc.com/bill-carmody/crowdfunding-the-ultimate-tool-for-entrepreneurs.html 
[https://perma.cc/FZ9Y-Q9HU].  
353.  Prior to the JOBS Act, rewards, donation, and lending based crowdfunding were, 
and continue to be, used by some small start-ups to obtain funding for their ventures.  Re-
ward-based financing involves offering some tangible benefit or service for a financial con-
tribution.  Donation-based crowdfunding entails seeking contributions where nothing of 
value is promised in return (typically a charitable contribution).  Lending crowdfunding al-
lows entrepreneurs to raise funds in the form of loans that they will pay back to the lenders 
over a pre-determined timeline with a set interest rate.  See generally Joan MacLeod 
Heminway, Securities Crowdfunding and Investor Protection 12 (Legal Stud. Res. Paper 
Series, Research Paper No. 292, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2810757 
[https://perma.cc/2K4T-4P3S]; Sally Outlaw, Which Type of Crowdfunding Is Best for You?, 
ENTREPRENEUR (Oct. 3, 2013) https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/228524 
[https://perma.cc/KB9A-KZ5C]. 
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funding to outpace that available through angel and venture capi-
tal investing in the future, a clear understanding of the costs, ben-
efits, and responsibilities associated with each funding option is 
critical to the sound financial management of a start-up.354 
Although Congress and the SEC have made it easier for 
small businesses to access the private equity market for funding, 
there still is a significant amount of work involved with conduct-
ing a successful fundraising campaign and complying with SEC 
rules.  The VDC can play an important role in this process.  Once 
the short and long-term financing needs are determined and a 
market analysis is performed, a valuation is established.355  Val-
uations are difficult to determine during early stages of venture 
development and depend on such factors as the number of poten-
tial users, the size of the market they serve, distribution channels, 
and reputation.356  Venture capitalists and angels employ several 
different methods to determine valuation.357  Without existing 
revenues however, such methodologies are still based upon as-
sumptions and guesses.  Without expert experience and guidance 
to temper the entrepreneur’s optimism, the valuations may be 
misleading potential investors. 
For example, in the event that a novice entrepreneur pursues 
funding through Title III (Crowdfunding), the company must reg-
354.  Trends Show, supra note 315.  
355.  A valuation is how much the company is worth.  Valuation of the company mat-
ters because it represents the portion of the company that the founders need to give away to 
investors in exchange for funding.  Early stage valuations are an art, rather than a science.  
Since the company really is not worth anything until it is profitable, valuation at early stages 
is more about the growth potential than the actual present value of the venture. See ASWATH 
DAMODARAN, THE DARK SIDE OF VALUATION: VALUING YOUNG, DISTRESSED, AND 
COMPLEX BUSINESSES 8, 213 (2d ed., 2010). 
356.  Anna Vital, How Startup Valuation Works – Infographic, ADIOMA (July 1, 
2013), http://fundersandfounders.com/how-startup-valuation-works/[https://perma.cc/2F 
G5-B7BF].  
357.  A few of the most popular methodologies follow.  The Venture Capital Method 
calculates valuation based on expected rates of return at exit.  The Berkus Method attributes 
a range of dollar values to the progress startup entrepreneurs have made in their commercial-
ization activities.  The Scorecard Valuation Method adjusts the median pre-money valuation 
for seed/startup deals in a particular region and in the business vertical of the target based on 
seven characteristics of the company.  Finally, the Risk Factor Summation Method compares 
twelve characteristics of the target company to what might be expected in a fundable 
seed/startup company.  Stéphane Nasser, Valuation for Startups – 9 Methods Explained, 
STARTUPS & VENTURE CAPITAL (June 14, 2016), https:// startupsventurecapital.com/ valu-
ation-for-startups-9-methods-explained-53771c86590e [https://perma.cc/Q5TV-Z2M2]. 
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ister with the SEC and provide comprehensive company infor-
mation to both the financial intermediary facilitating the offerings 
as well as the potential investors.358  This information includes 
business plans, financial statements, the price of the security, how 
it was valued, and how the proceeds from the sale will be used.359  
A VDC can play a critical role in this process by validating the 
information provided to investors and evaluating the selection of 
the financial intermediary to facilitate the offering.  Since the 
VDC will have a financial stake in the company through the own-
ership of shares, they are accountable, along with the founders, 
for any untrue statement or omission of material fact that misleads 
the investors.  The selection of the financial intermediary can be 
very complicated and time consuming.  Currently there are 34 
funding portals registered with the SEC and members of 
FINRA,360 all having slightly different operating philosophies, 
services, and fee structures.  In addition, there are more than 4,000 
broker-dealers, who may choose to establish platforms to take ad-
vantage of the market opportunities presented by the JOBS 
Act.361  Both portals and platforms have SEC compliance obliga-
tions to ensure the eligibility of investors and issuers.362  They 
also must publish issuer information and disclosures and provide 
a way for investors to communicate with issuers.363  However, 
there are a number of important differences.  Portals cannot solicit 
offers to purchase securities, hold investor money, or provide in-
vestment advice.364 
Portals and broker-dealer platforms are under no obligation 
to work with a company that is seeking funding.  The VDC can 
play a vital role in establishing the credibility of the company with 
358.  Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Crowdfunding 
Intermediaries, supra note 300.   
359.  Id. 
360.  Funding Portals We Regulate, FINRA (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.finra.org 
/about /funding-portals-we-regulate [https://perma.cc/UHN4-CT3K].  
361.  Jonathon Sandlund, Crowdfunding Platforms and Broker Dealers: An Evolving 
Relationship, THE CROWD CAFE (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.thecrowdcafe.com/ crowdfund-
ing- platforms- and- broker-dealers/ [https://perma.cc/8HNZ-ZZGV].  
362.  David M. Freedman, Distinguishing Crowdfunding Portals and Broker-Dealer 
Platforms Under Title III, FINANCIAL POISE (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.financialpoise.com/ 
columns/ crowdfunding-for-investors/ distinguishing-crowdfunding-portals-and-broker-
dealer-platforms-under-title-iii/ [https://perma.cc/4WQC-2NDJ].  
363.  Id. 
364.  Id. 
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these intermediaries.  As VDCs work with start-ups, they will es-
tablish reputations in the marketplace.  Those that work well with 
the financial intermediaries will be sought after, along with the 
small businesses with which they are associated.365  The VDC can 
also serve to add an element of integrity in this nascent on-line 
marketplace for private equity.  Much like the premier venture 
capitalists, investors will gravitate towards those with the best 
reputations and records of accomplishment. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Throughout history, private equity has played an important 
role in assisting entrepreneurs in transforming innovations into 
commercially viable products for the consuming public.  This in-
novation has been the most important component of long-term 
economic growth in the United States.  However, funding alone 
does not transform an idea into a vibrant successful business. 
Strategic guidance and management support from those providing 
the private equity is perhaps even more important. 
Much of the success that Georges Doriot achieved as the fa-
ther of venture capital was due to his hard work and the personal 
interest he took in his companies.366  Toward the end of his career, 
however, he lamented the fact that venture capital was turning 
into a method of speculation, focusing on a quick profit.367  VDCs 
will be a vehicle for investor/mentors to work with entrepreneurs 
in the way Doriot did. 
Similarly, the federal policy initiatives discussed in this arti-
cle can make more money available to more investors in more 
parts of the country.  For them to do this effectively, however, 
there must be a cadre of dedicated experienced investors willing 
to contribute not only their money, but also their time, effort, and 
expertise.  Such investors are now in short supply.  The Venture 
Development Company can be a vehicle to bring these investors 
into the system and to put their talents to the best use. 
365.  Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, there could also be a certification 
process that Venture Development Companies could undertake to be accredited. 
366.  Scott Kirsner, Venture Capital’s Grandfather, BOSTON.COM (Apr. 6, 2008), 
http://archive.boston.com/business/articles/2008/04/06/venture_capitals_grandfather/ 
[https://perma.cc/4WQC-2NDJ].  
367.  See Beattie, supra note 61.  
